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ABSTRACT
Quality Control (QC) and Quality Assurance (QA) is a planned systematic
approach to secure the satisfactory performance of Hot mix asphalt (HMA) construction
projects. Millions of dollars are invested by government and state highway agencies to
construct large-scale HMA construction projects. QC/QA is statistical approach for
checking the desired construction properties through independent testing. The practice of
QC/QA has been encouraged by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) since the
mid 60’s. However, the standard QC/QA practice is often criticized on how effective such
statistical tests and how representative the reported material tests are. Material testing data
alteration in the HMA construction sector can render the QC/QA practice ineffective and
shadow the performance of asphalt pavements.
The American Society of Civil Engineers estimates that $340 billion is lost globally
each year due to corruption in the construction industry. Asphalt pavement construction
consists of several sectors, including construction and transportation, which are prone to
potential suspicious activities. There is approximately 18 billion tons of asphalt pavement
on American roads, which makes the costs of potential suspicious activities unacceptably
large.
The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) relies on contractor-produced QC test
results for the payment of the HMA pavement projects. In 2017, a case study by FHWA
found some unnatural trends where 74% of the ITD test results didn’t match with the
contractor results. ITD’s approach to track down the accuracy of mix design and volumetric
vi

test data set the off-stage of this research to mark out instances of suspicious activities in
asphalt pavement projects.
The first objective of this research was to develop algorithmic logics to recognize
the patterns of discrepancies in agency- and contractor-produced QC/QA test results. This
was possible with a unique dataset that ITD collected from several dozen HMA projects,
in which all instances of data entry into the material testing report file was recorded in the
background, without the operators’ knowledge. My solution was bifurcated into
development of an algorithm combining the logics to automatically detect and categorize
suspicious instances when multiple data entries were observed. Modern data mining
approaches were also used to explore the latent insights and screen out suspicious
incidences to identify the chances of suboptimal materials used for paving and extra
payment in HMA pavement projects. I have also successfully prompted supervised
machine learning techniques to detect suspicious cases of data alterations.
The second step of this research was to calculate the monetary losses due to data
alteration. I replicated ITD’s procedure for HMA payment calculation, and quantified
payment-related parameters and associated payment for each project for two cases: 1. when
the first parameter value categorized as Suspicious Alteration (S.A.) was used for payment
calculation, and 2. when the last S.A. parameter value was used for payment. It was evident
from my findings that there has been overpayment on construction projects across Idaho
due to material testing data alterations. Overall, based on the available audit data, I found
that overpayments have ranged from $14,000 to $360,000. Further analysis showed that
alteration of each major material testing parameter’s value can cause roughly $1,000 to
$5,000 overpayment. I also note that data alteration did not always cause monetary gains.
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Other possible motives may include passing Percent Within Limit (PWL) criteria and
precision criteria. Throughout the research, I strive to automate a suspicious activity
detection system and calculate the associated excessive payment.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Introduction and Research Problems
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has been encouraging contractors
and Departments of Transportation (DOTs) from the mid 1960’s to use statistics-based
quality control and quality assurance (QC/QA) to ensure pavement products fulfill the
design specifications provided by the highway agency (Akkinepally & Attoh-okine, 2006).
QC/QA specifications are a combination of end result specifications and materials and
methods specifications (Akkinepally & Attoh-okine, 2006; Transportation Research Board
Glossary, 2018). Contractors and highway agencies typically collect material testing data
and later statistically compare them through F & T tests to ensure the required quality of
the product used in transportation infrastructures is achieved. DOTs, usually being short of
physical and financial resources, have limited capability of sampling and testing all
projects. Hence, often the material testing data for the department is also collected by third
party contractors. With limited control of the DOT over material testing and reporting, the
collected datasets are vulnerable to probable data alteration. Such a case of data alteration
evidence was seen in a recent study by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). Under
the scope of this study, a research project was initiated to classify the data alteration
instances to plausible corrections and suspicious alterations. While I refrain from using the
term “fraud” while referring to detected suspicious data alterations in this study, given that
a pure data mining approach is not able to detect/classify fraud, I provide a brief literature
review on fraudulent activities in various sectors in the following paragraphs. This helps
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in putting a worst-case scenario – which might or might not have materialized – into
broader context.
Fraud is a willful act that can be associated with the intention of gaining financial
benefit, which is obviously against the law (Wang et al., 2006; Ngai et al., 2011). The
World Bank estimates that fraudulent activities cost the global economy around $2.6
trillion annually, which is equal to 5% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016
(United Nations, 2018). Loss of public assets through corruption can significantly affect
the limited resources of a country. Any damage in the public fund through corruption can
increase the revolutionary feelings among people as they see their tax dollars being used
in wrongful ways (Power and Taylor, 2011). This wicked problem may lead down the path
to more corruption and can disrupt economic progress.
Corruption and fraud have been a critical global issue in the construction and
transportation sectors. Despite the existence of corruption in public construction projects,
it is one of the less attended sectors in efforts against corruption. Corruption acts as a barrier
against the growth of developing countries and the continuation of growth in developed
countries (Treisman, 2007; Tabish and Jha, 2011; Loosemore and Lim, 2015; Locatelli et
al., 2017). Transparency International identifies the construction sector as the largest
corrupted sector compared to other sectors such as banking, insurance, securities, etc. The
construction sector is prone to corruption because of the complex and convoluted
involvement of different parties (Krishnan, 2009).
While traditionally various investigation methods have been used for detection of
fraud, the application of Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in
unearthing fraud and corruption is receiving a lot of attention in the literature in recent
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years (Stockemer, 2018; Sun and Medaglia, 2019; Tang et al., 2019). According to Forbes
magazine, there are 2.5 quintillion bytes of data produced each day at the current pace. It
is not humanly possible to monitor or foresee fraudulent attempts within the large volume
of data, although even small data alteration might lead to significant losses. With the
advancement of modern data analytics capacity, the application of AI in the public sector
has received a growing interest (de Sousa et al., 2019). AI can significantly contribute to
untangling fraud related evidences by working closely with large scale datasets (Lima and
Delen, 2020).
Research Objectives and Tasks
The initial objective of this research was to develop a logic-based algorithm to
distinguish between instances of Plausible Correction (P.C.) and Suspicious Alteration
(S.A.) in audit data from material testing reports of several Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA)
projects. Also, applicability of well-established ML algorithms in classifying large-scale
audit data from construction sites was tested in this research. Audit data were acquired
from ITD, which included all instances of value entry for mix design parameters in HMA
projects. A VBA macro was encoded by ITD into the Excel reporting files that registered
all data entries for each parameter in each test, and hence provided extensive and invaluable
information about data alteration in material testing reports. All material testing data were
reported to ITD through these excel files. These VBA encoded files included all the audit
data, whether a value for any parameter was entered once or multiple times. This presented
the opportunity for taking a close look at all the modifications/alterations for any reported
parameter.
A 2017 forensic case study by ITD first highlighted the inconsistent mix design
parameter data from QC/QA test results. It was suspected from their study that the collected
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data might have been reported inappropriately several times. While various reasons can
explain data alterations, the worst-case scenario corresponds to the situation where data
alteration is directed to achieve increased pay factors or to pass substandard projects. The
objective of this research was to classify construction audit data into either green (Plausible
Correction / P.C.) or red (Suspicious Alteration / S.A.) zone. This probable data alteration
can often lead to not only financial losses but also poorly paved roadways. Alongside the
classification task, the monetary loss associated with suspicious alteration of material
testing report data in multiple HMA projects across Idaho was calculated.
Research goals include:
i.

Development of a logic-based algorithm to classify repetitive data entries
in construction projects’ audit data to P.C. and S.A.

ii.

Application of ML algorithms to evaluate whether or not patterns
recognized by logic-based algorithms are evident to machine as well.

iii.

Monetary analysis to quantify the amount of economic loss due to S.A.
cases for the analyzed projects.

Research tasks carried out to accomplish the above described goals were:
i.

Review of existing literature: Existing literature on data alteration and
fraudulent attempts were studied to understand the underlying reasons for
such acts on a global scale. Unfortunately, there is not much research
available on data alteration/manipulation in the construction sector. A
majority of the fraudulent cases have been registered in banking, insurance,
securities, commodities, and the corporate sectors. Other aspects of
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corruption in the literature, including bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks in
construction sector were also checked.
ii.

Data organization and cleaning: I received audit data files from ITD, which
had the recorded, altered data from material testing results. The dataset was
large in volume and needed proper “cleaning” before the application of
logic-based algorithms. Additionally, more data, i.e., test summary, lot
information, volume of material, etc. was organized/cleaned for the later
part of the analysis.

iii.

Development of algorithmic logics: At the initial part of the research, one
project data was examined manually to untangle the general trend of data
alteration. This resulted in several cases of probable data alteration as well
as typing errors. Subsequently, more projects were manually analyzed to
see if such patterns exist in different projects, and if there are other patterns
in the altered data. Later these findings were converted to if/else cases and
assembled to an algorithm to detect similar cases for all projects.

iv.

Application of supervised ML algorithms: Alongside the development of
customized algorithm I also focused on the application of ML algorithms to
assess the effectiveness of strategies of the logic-based work. Several
renowned ML techniques, including K-nearest neighbor, logistic
regression, decision tree/random forest, neural network, support vector
machine, and discriminant analysis, were used on the audit data. Due to the
unavailability of categorized data, I used my previously classified data as
the training/validation source of ML classifications. None of the projects
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had a large enough dataset to fit a machine learning model; therefore, I
merged data from all projects to train/test the models. This task further
confirmed the logics that were developed in the earlier step to be consistent.
v.

Monetary analysis: In this step, I quantified the amount of money that
should have been paid if there was no data alteration. The idea was to check
if there has been any overpayment in the asphalt pavement projects.

vi.

Comparison of overpayment and pass/fail of payment parameters: At the
final stage of this thesis the amount of money that has been overpaid for
each project was reported. There were also some pass/fail tests for the
payment parameters prior to the payment calculation. An overall
comparison of those pass/fail tests is also shown for each project.

Findings from the tasks carried out under the scope of this master’s thesis research
have been documented in two manuscripts prepared to be submitted to peer-reviewed
journals. Table 1-1 lists the different tasks and how they were divided between the two
manuscripts.
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Table 1-1
Tasks carried out under the scope of the current master’s thesis
research, and corresponding manuscripts
Tasks
1

2
3

Name
Developing algorithmic logics to classify
construction projects’ Audit data to Plausible
Correction (P.C) and Suspicious Alteration
(S.A.)
Application of well-established supervised
machine learning algorithms to detect probable
P.C. & S.A.
Monetary analysis to quantify the amount of
economic loss due to S.A. cases

Manuscript

Manuscript #1

Manuscript #2

This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter presents a detailed
background of the research problem, and outlines the research questions and hypotheses
that were addressed through this master’s thesis research. Brief descriptions of different
tasks carried out to accomplish the overall research goal have been provided. Descriptions
of the tasks and the corresponding findings have been divided into two technical
manuscripts, which constitute Chapters Two and Three of the current thesis. The first
manuscript (Chapter Two of the thesis) details the development of the logic-based
algorithm to distinguish between different categories of data alteration during quality
control and acceptance testing. Audit data provided by ITD has been used to identify
different data alteration patterns and for the development of the logic-based algorithm.
Supervised ML techniques played a supporting role during this task. Different ML
approaches were implemented, and their accuracies were compared against the previously
developed algorithmic logics.
The second manuscript (Chapter Three of the thesis) focuses entirely on quantifying
the financial impact of data inconsistencies encountered in HMA quality control and
acceptance testing. The primary objective was to highlight the extent of impact that data
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inconsistencies can have on the overall costs to state highway agencies. Chapter Four
summarizes major findings from the current study and provides recommendations for
future research that can lead to the implementation of improved quality control and
acceptance testing practices by state and local highway agencies.
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CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPING ALGORITHMIC LOGICS AND APPLICATION OF
MACHINE LEARNING TO CLASSIFY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS’ AUDIT
DATA TO PLAUSIBLE CORRECTION AND SUSPICIOUS ALTERATION
Introduction
Construction of a cost-effective, well-performing pavement section is largely
dependent on sound construction practices and material quality control. The process of
Quality Control (QC)/ Quality Assurance (QA) involves QC testing by the contractor, and
acceptance testing by the state Department of Transportation (DOT) to ensure all required
standards are met. QC/QA is a combined procedure consisting of materials/methods or
end-result specification. Depending on a particular DOT’s policies, payments to
contractors are made upon comparison of the quality control and acceptance testing data.
As these tests are conducted on random samples collected from the same population, it is
expected that the test results would ‘agree’ with each other. For cases where the results do
not ‘agree’, further investigation is required to identify the source of the discrepancy.
Inconsistencies in quality control and acceptance testing data can ultimately lead to poorperforming pavements.
A 2017 forensic investigation into Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) projects’ material
testing reports in Idaho revealed unnatural trends and inconsistencies between the data that
contractors reported and the data that ITD collected. In fact, only 26% of the contractor
results were in good agreement with the ITD-produced test results. This motivated my
study to investigate the prevalence and sources of data inconsistencies in HMA quality
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control and acceptance testing data. To further investigate the reasons behind this data
discrepancy, ITD engineers inserted a VBA Macro code into ITD’s material testing report
Excel files, which recorded all instances of data entry for each parameter in the background
(not visible to the operator). This audit data was then made available to the Boise State
research team. All recorded instances of data entry were investigated for 15 available
projects from the year 2018, and modern data mining and logic development approaches
were implemented to classify repetitive data entries into two categories: (1) Plausible
Correction (PC); and (2) Suspicious Alteration (S.A.). Through extensive manual analysis
of audit data, I found patterns of P.C. and S.A. instances, which were then coded into logicbased computer programs that automatically classified all audit data. Note that the audit
files comprised data from both QC as well as acceptance testing. Therefore, the data files
analyzed in this study may have been generated by the contractor (during QC testing) or
the agency (during acceptance testing). Also, it is important to note that both contractor
and agency hired third-party testing laboratories to run the tests on multiple occasions.
Therefore, the test data could also have been generated by a third-party laboratory.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, if a data file was finally signed by the agency
(DOT), it was treated as agency (DOT) data irrespective of whether the tests were
physically run in the DOT lab or a third-party lab. Similarly, if a data file was submitted
by the contractor, it was treated as contractor’ data even if the tests might have been
physically performed at a third-party testing laboratory. To avoid inherent bias during the
data analysis and interpretation, this thesis uses the names “Entity 1” and “Entity 2” to refer
to agency and contractor data, not necessarily in the same order. In other words, it has not
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been disclosed to the reader whether Entity 1 represents data from the agency or contractor.
The same is the case for Entity 2.
Overall, I found that there were 2,268 instances where the alteration of 595 unique
parameters by Entity 1 could be classified as S.A. Similarly, considering the data for Entity
2, 387 unique parameters were altered a total of 1,266 times, with the alterations classified
as S.A. Similarly, considering P.C. occurrences, Entity 1’s data accounted for 316 unique
parameters being altered 660 times; from Entity 2’s audit files, the alteration of 280 unique
parameters for a total of 587 times can be categorized as P.C. Further, I evaluated the
potential of supervised Machine Learning (ML) algorithms to detect the patterns that were
captured in the logic-based analysis. Trained over combined data from all projects, Support
Vector Machine and Discriminant Analysis models exceeded accuracy rates of 70%,
pointing to their ability to observe similar patterns in the data as those manually set.
Further, I pose that if large homogenous data (e.g. from one large project rather than from
multiple projects) were used to train the models, the model performances could have
improved significantly.
Background and Problem Statement
QC acts as a checklist of procedures to confirm the quality of a paving work based
on certain specifications set by highway agencies in the contract documents. QC processes
are required to be followed by the contractors to ensure the longevity of a newly paved
work is secured. Before formally accepting a project, typically, a product is verified by the
state/contracting agencies through sampling/testing or inspecting to identify products
compliance with the product requirement. QC and acceptance can be jointly defined as
QC/QA, which includes evaluation of design, development of plans and specifications,
awarding of contracts, and maintenance, among others, to ensure satisfactory performance.
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Federal agencies instruct the state departments of transportation (DOTs) to maintain a QA
program to carefully inspect the materials used for highway/transportation infrastructure
(Coenen et al., 2019). DOTs generally follow different standard specification/test results
to evaluate the pavement and quantify the payment (Newcomb et at., 2016; Al-Khayat et
al., 2020).
QC/QA is important to maintain the quality and meet the specified quality
thresholds. Any deviation from the design specifications can result in sub-standard work
and reduce the life span of HMA pavements. QA typically follows a statistics-based
approach, i.e. F & T test, to test whether or not contractor-reported QC material testing
data and those of the state DOT come from the same population (Coenen et al., 2019).
Although passing the agreement tests should ensure a good quality product, it is important
that the reported test data be representative of the actual material used for pavement.
Examples of data alteration in material testing reports have been recently detected in ITD’s
investigations. While I refrain from using fraud for the detected suspicious data alterations
in this study, given that a pure data mining approach is not able to detect/classify fraud, I
provide a brief literature review on fraudulent activities in various sectors in the following
paragraph. This helps in putting a worst case from this research scenario – which might or
might not have materialized – into broader context.
According to the formal definition of the Oxford dictionary, fraud is an act of
deception, an intentional concealment, omission or perversion of truth, to (1) gain unlawful
or unfair advantage, (2) induce another to part with some valuable item or surrender a legal
right, or (3) inflict injury in some manner. Willful fraud is a criminal offense that calls for
severe penalties. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2010) classifies
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fraud cases to asset misappropriation, corruption, and financial statement fraud. The
occurrence of fraud is widespread in sectors like banking, insurance, securities, health,
commodities mass market, and the corporate sector (Atwood et al., 2006; Srivastava et al.,
2008; Perols, 2011; Perols and Lougee, 2011; Markelevich and Rosner, 2013; West et al.,
2015; Perols et al., 2017; Jain and Shinde, 2019).
Recently, media and the public have shown a surge of interest in revealing and
preventing corruption in the construction industry. A report in the New York Times (Bagli,
2018) stated investigators eye a possible $100 million in construction fraud. An executive
of a large construction company anonymously claimed such a big amount of overpayment
in New York as part of bribery, bid-rigging and kickbacks. Another article published in
Oregon Public Broadcasting (Manning, 2019) reported that construction fraud was filed
against a contractor working on school construction in Portland. This fraudulent case was
responsible for nearly $3 million in construction overpayments. A similar case was seen in
a billion-dollar school modernization project where three contractors were accused of fraud
(Craig, 2019). All of them were accused of “pass-through” contracts where they allowed a
minority owned company to be receiving illicit payment without completing any sort of
works. Similar cases were also reported globally. A forensic investigation on a construction
company in Toronto revealed an $80 million trail of phony invoices by allegedly
mimicking the names of legitimate sub-contractors on several key projects (Harvey, 2019).
Such works resulted in contractors stopping their work, suppliers shutting down for no
payment and finally walking to the path of bankruptcy. The investigation of bankruptcy
revealed the alleged fraud payments running from 2011. Further, China demolished three
high-rise buildings as part of anti-corruption where it was stated as a “serious breach of
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planning regulations” that posed a major safety risk (Hewitt, 2015). Based on the original
plan two of the three buildings were supposed to be of 31 and the other one 35 floors, but
after finishing they were found to be 41, 58 and 65 floors high, respectively. One of them
was a total of 88 meters taller than it should have been.
The American Society of Civil Engineers estimated that corruption consumes $340
billion (U.S. dollars) each year in the global construction industry (Sohail and Cavill, 2008;
Kyriacou et al., 2015). The construction industry indeed has a reputation for corruption,
asset misappropriation, and bribery across the globe (Zarkada-Faser and Skitmore, 2000;
Sohail and Cavill, 2008). Corruption in construction takes several forms, including bribery,
embezzlement, kickbacks, and fraud. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) reports extraction, construction, and transportation sectors to be the
leading corrupt sectors in the world based on a study of over 400 cases worldwide
(Robertson, 2014). There are several causes of fraudulent activities, including conflict of
interests, tight margins, monopolistic service delivery, political interference, fragmented
nature, low transparency in project selection, involvement of multiple stakeholders in a
complex structure, variety of human psychological behavior preferences, large flow of
public money, and competitive tendering process (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Sohail and
Cavill, 2008; De Jong et al., 2009; Gunduz and Onder, 2012; Nordin et al., 2013).
Asphalt pavement construction projects involve extraction, construction and
transportation sectors, making them vulnerable to fraudulent activities. The National
Asphalt Pavement Association (NAPA, n.d.) reports that in 2013 state and local
governments spent more than $110 billion and the federal government spent $46 billion on
the nation’s highways asphalt pavement, pointing to massive public tax dollars invested in
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this sector and highlighting the importance of scientific investigation of potentially
suspicious activities in this sector.
Many of the state transportation agencies, including the Idaho Transportation
Department (ITD), rely on contractor-produced Quality Control (Q.C.) test results for
calculating payments for HMA pavement projects (Hand et al., 2020). Note that starting
from the year 2020, ITD has stopped the practice of considering contractor-reported test
data for pay factor calculations. Nevertheless, the current research study was undertaken
in 2018 and focused on ITD’s QC/QA approach in effect through the end of 2019. A 2017
forensic investigation by ITD looked into 13 preselected pavement projects and found that
out of 77 material testing reports, only 26% of the tests showed agreement between the
ITD-generated results and the contractor-reported test values. This alarming mismatch not
only can impact pavement projects’ pay-factors, but also can have significant repercussions
concerning the pavement service life and maintenance costs. Further inspection revealed
that 40% of the investigated projects showed moderate distress two to five years after
construction, whereas the design life of the pavements was 20 years.
Objective and Scope
The objective of this research was to develop a framework to learn the patterns in
the audit material test results for several HMA projects and classify the observed data
alterations into Plausible Correction (P.C.) and Suspicious Alteration (S.A.). I use this
terminology as detection of fraudulent activity requires a forensic analysis that cannot
entirely be captured in a data mining approach. I first developed a logic-based algorithm
based on an expert categorization of audit data into P.C./S.A. instances. Subsequently, I
developed several supervised ML models to evaluate their capability to recognize the
patterns in the labeled audit data.
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Data Alteration
Both forensic analysis and anecdotal interviews with ITD and consulting engineers
point to the possible existence of data alterations in HMA project reports (Dutton, 2020).
This is concerning given substandard materials that might have been used for construction
of some pavement projects that may result in lower than expected service life, higher
maintenance costs, and in extreme cases even lower safety. ITD is investing $535 million
(both federal and state funds) in Idaho highways in 2021 and a similar amount each year
afterward by 2027; and suspicious activities and altered material testing values have the
potential to cost taxpayers millions of dollars (ITD, 2019).
Figure 2-1 shows an image of a laboratory datasheet submitted to ITD during one
of the HMA projects being looked into. As seen from the datasheet, the values in several
fields were altered and over-written several times during the course of testing. This is
particularly evident from the Under-Water (UW) and Saturated Surface Dry (SSD)
weights. Some of this can be attributed to the possibility that scale readings were affected
by the testing environment (such as excessive wind draft in the laboratory). However,
repeated occurrence of such trends raises serious concerns about the quality of the test
results. Moreover, such instances of alteration were also observed in cases where the test
data were directly entered into the Excel-based data form (instances of data alteration in
the Excel-based form were obtained through the embedded macro code). This emphasizes
the importance of studying the extent of such data inconsistencies in the reported values,
and developing approaches to prevent future occurrences of such poor testing practices.
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Figure 2-1

Data alteration on a paper data reporting sheet
Description of Available Audit Data

I acquired the material testing reported audit files from ITD for several HMA
projects completed in Idaho during the year 2018. These Excel files comprised an internal
audit algorithm (embedded by ITD) to record the sequences of changing parameter values
in the background (not visible to the operator). Figure 2-2 presents a screenshot of a typical
data input file to record material testing data. For example, if an operator inputs the value
(2122.9 in this case) for Mass of bowl (red box) for increment 1 (blue circle), that value is
recorded under $U$32 (corresponding cell number for mass of bowl (increment 1) in the
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Excel file). If the operator deletes the value (2122.9) and registers a new value (2500 for
example) both values are registered under $U$32 in the audit file with the corresponding
time stamp.

Figure 2-2

Audit file to record material testing data

The dataset has several interesting characteristics:
i.

Material test reporting Excel files had a VBA script embedded, which had a
unique ability to record each data entry typed in the excel sheet. This develops
a chronological record of all values entered into the spreadsheet in the form of
an audit log. Inspection of this audit log can give a clear picture of how the test
results were recorded. Figure 2-3 presents a screenshot of the audit log file for
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one of the projects. Note that all identifying information, such as project name,
test date, test time, testing lab, among others, have been removed from the
figures in this manuscript to ensure the anonymity of the testing/reporting
entities.
ii.

Audit data was available for both quality control as well as acceptance tests. In
other words, records of data entries were available for certain projects
irrespective of whether the tests were performed by the contractor (or a thirdparty testing laboratory hired by the contractor) or the state DOT (or a thirdparty testing laboratory hired by the state). As already mentioned, the primary
objective of the current research was to study the data alteration patterns during
HMA quality control and acceptance testing. The discussions in this manuscript
do not focus on whether the data alterations were carried out by representatives
of the contractor or the state DOT.

iii.

All parameters that would affect the payments of each project were also
provided, which are listed in Table 2-1. There is a total of 27 different
parameters that affect the payment. They are categorized into three different
categories (major/moderate/minor).
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Figure 2-3

Screenshot of the Audit Log File showing data alteration in excel file
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Table 2-1
parameters

Material testing parameters and their impacts on pay-factor related

Cell Description

Voids in
the
Mineral
Aggregate
(VMA)

Air
Voids

Density

Major/
Moderate/
Minor
Effect

Mass of Bowl (Increment 1) ($U$32)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Major

Mass of Bowl and Sample Dry (Increment 1) ($U$33)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Major

Submerged Weight of Bowl and Sample (Increment 1)
($U$37)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Major

Submerged Weight of Bowl (Increment 1) ($U$38)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Major

Mass of Bowl (Increment 2) ($Z$32)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Major

Mass of Bowl and Sample Dry (Increment 2) ($Z$33)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Major

Submerged Weight of Bowl and Sample (Increment 2)
($Z$37)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Major

Submerged Weight of Bowl (Increment 2) ($Z$38)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Major

Mass of Puck Dry (Specimen 1) ($U$61)

Yes

Yes

No

Major

Submerged Weight of Puck in Water (Specimen 1)
($U$62)

Yes

Yes

No

Major

Weight of Puck SSD (Specimen 1) ($U$63)

Yes

Yes

No

Major

Mass of Puck Dry (Specimen 2) ($Z$61)

Yes

Yes

No

Major

Submerged Weight of Puck in Water (Specimen 2)
($Z$62)

Yes

Yes

No

Major

Weight of Puck SSD (Specimen 2) ($Z$63)

Yes

Yes

No

Major

Mass Basket Assembly ($S$111)

Yes

No

No

Moderate

Mass Basket Assembly & Initial Sample ($S$112)

Yes

No

No

Moderate

Mass Basket Assembly & Final Aggregate ($S$114)

Yes

No

No

Moderate

Ignition Furnace Correction Factor ($S$116)

Yes

No

No

Moderate
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Calibration Factor ($AP$114)

Yes

No

No

Moderate

Uncorrected Binder Content ($AP$115)

Yes

No

No

Moderate

Pan Mass ($N$128)

Yes

No

No

Minor

Mass Pan and Initial Sample ($N$129)

Yes

No

No

Minor

Drying Cycle 1 Mass Pan and Sample ($Z$129)

Yes

No

No

Minor

Drying Cycle 2 Mass Pan and Sample ($Z$130)

Yes

No

No

Minor

Drying Cycle 3 Mass Pan and Sample ($Z$131)

Yes

No

No

Minor

Drying Cycle 4 Mass Pan and Sample ($Z$132)

Yes

No

No

Minor

Drying Cycle 5 Mass Pan and Sample ($Z$133)

Yes

No

No

Minor

iv.

Payment affecting parameters are similar for both department and contractorreported data (Table 2-1). However, parameters that affect Density are only
reported by the state DOT data. Those parameters are enlisted in Table 2-2.
These parameters are monitored by ITD to decide on whether a particular
asphalt mix meets specifications or not (VMA and Air Voids), and also whether
a constructed pavement section has been adequately compacted or not (main
line density). Reading 1 and 2 and Device Used are reported more than one time
for each lot. So, if there are 2 tests in lot 1, then for reading 1, test 1 and 2 values
would be registered in cell $AC$37 and $AC$38, respectively. Basically, there
are only three parameters (Reading 1 and 2, Device used) in the density-related
data.
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Table 2-2
Material testing parameters (density) and their impacts on pay-factor
related parameters
Voids in
the
Mineral
Aggregate
(VMA)

Air Voids

Density

Major/Minor
Effect

Reading 1 ($AC$37-$AC$61)

No

No

Yes

Major

Reading 2 ($AG$37-$AG$61)

No

No

Yes

Major

Device Used ($X$37-$X$61)

No

No

Yes

Major

Cell Description

v.

Total number of material testing parameters (department/contractor/density) is
summarized in Table 2-3.

Table 2-3

Total number of material testing parameters

Parameter type

Total number (Department
and Contractor)

Total number (Density)

Parameters with major impact
Parameters with moderate impact

14
6

3-75
0

Parameters with minor impact

7

0

Classification of Parameter Changes to Plausible Correction and Suspicious
Alteration
The following section describes the approach adopted to categorize the data
alterations into two groups: (1) Plausible Correction (P.C.) or (2) Suspicious Alteration
(S.A.). The whole process was accomplished in several steps.
i.

The first step was to separate the repeated data from the non-repeated incidents.
Non-repeated data represent cases where no change in values was recorded for
certain parameters in the input form.
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ii.

The second step involved manual inspection of all the repeated (altered) data to
identify any existing patterns. Data alterations identified through this approach
were categorized into P.C. and S.A.
Plausible Correction (P.C.): The incidents where values were likely not changed
deliberately. The most likely cause of such changes was mistyping while
entering the data from paper reports in the excel files.
Suspicious Alteration (S.A.): The incidents of altered values that I could not
attribute to typographical and other cases of mistakes, after exhaustive
consultation with advisors and engineers. Such alterations may have been done
intentionally to reach the desired value, potentially change the payment, and/or
modify a certain test outcome.

iii.

Third step was to find general patterns in P.C. and S.A. cases.

iv.

A total of 7 and 4 general patterns were found for the P.C. and S.A. categories,
respectively.

v.

Algorithmic logics were devised for each case, and computer codes were
developed to automatically detect and categorize data value changes

Development of Algorithms and Code:
This was accomplished in several steps:
i.

Initially, all cells with repeated values (more than one entry) associated with the
pay effecting parameters in each project were identified.
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Figure 2-4
Repeated data entry (third column) of pay affecting parameters
(second column; e.g. $U$32) for tests in a project (first column; e.g. Test(17)). Time
of data entry is presented in column 4.
ii.

Repeated cells are then separated per parameter name. In Figure 2-5, for
example, parameter $U$32 (mass of bowl) is separated.

Figure 2-5

Separation of cells based on parameter name
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iii.

For each parameter, one set of samples (i.e. tests) is then considered at a time.
Figure 2-5 had both sample Test(17) and Test(22), but in this step, we only
consider one set of samples, i.e. Test(17) (Figure 2-6).

Figure 2-6
iv.

Separation of cells based on test/sample

Cells are then run through a series of algorithms to determine cases of P.C. and
S.A.

v.

When there are multiple repetitions for a single parameter, each two
consecutive entries (for instance, 1st and 2nd entry of a series of alterations) are
considered a pair, and these pairs are run through the algorithms to be labelled
P.C. or S.A. This is repeated for all pairs (e.g. 2nd and 3rd, 3rd and 4th, and so
on). Once the serial comparison is completed, the first and last entries are
considered a pair, and a similar analysis is done. I noted that there were some
cases where the values were changed by a very small amount in every
repetition, but this was done multiple times. In this case, each pair was labeled
as P.C., but the comparison of first and last entries showed S.A. If the result is
P.C. for all the pairs, the entire group is labeled as P.C. Upon detection of S.A.,
the entire group is labeled S.A. This procedure is visually represented in Figure
2-7.
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Figure 2-7

Methodology for Suspicious Alteration/Plausible Correction detection

Scenarios to Categorize Data Alteration as Plausible Correction
Case 1: One digit may be pressed instead of a neighboring key
While typing a digit, there is always a chance that another digit is mistakenly
pressed instead of the desired number. For my analysis, I have considered a keypad like
that of Figure 2-8, because in most of the desktop computers the keypad has this format.
Here, I have considered all the possible cases that can happen when typing a number.

Figure 2-8

Plausible correction (case 1)
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Usually, the neighboring keys surrounding a particular number key have the highest
probability of being mistakenly pressed. As in Figure 2-8 (left), if we consider number 5,
the closest buttons to 5 are 2, 4, 6, 8. I assume the probability of mistakenly pressing any
of these digits instead of 5 is the same. Similarly, for the number 8 (refer to Figure 2-8,
right), the closest keys are for numbers 5, 7, and 9. An algorithm was developed to label
the repetition as P.C. if the number of repetitions is only one (there has been a change only
from the 1st case to the 2nd case) and only one digit (at any position) is changed. This
method is considered for all numbers from 0 to 9, and a series of neighboring possibilities
are considered in each individual possible case. The algorithm first separates each digit of
a number. In the next step, the algorithm does an element by element comparison and tries
to identify if the changed digit fits in the closest neighboring category.

Figure 2-9

Plausible correction (case 1)—example

In Figure 2-9, for example, the number of changes/repetitions is only one and it is
for one digit only (2250.7 versus 2251.7). My algorithm eliminates all the similar digits
between the two entries except for the 4th digit. Then, a comparison is made for the
unmatched digit, which is 0 versus 1 in this case. Since 1 fits in the adjacent neighboring
rule of 0, this is considered a P.C.
Case 2: One or two digits were missed while typing
A very common scenario of plausible correction is 1 or 2 digits were missed while
trying to type quickly or simply because the desired digit was not pressed properly. An
individual might want to press 123, but instead, he/she presses 13 and misses 2. This is a
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clear case of an honest mistake or P.C. The logic that was used here is that if the 2nd entry
is smaller than 80% or larger than 120% of the first input, then it is a P.C. I pose that S.A.s
are generally around the vicinity of the actual value but are altered to return a better result.
When the two values are too different, it is most probably a P.C. case.
An element-wise comparison is simply not possible in this case because the missing
number can be any digit at any place. Generally, if a number is missed, the first entry
becomes much smaller than the final or corrected entry. Hence a percentage difference can
help determine this case. However, there is no fixed percentage threshold that I can specify
to accurately determine the missed number case, but through the manual analysis of data,
the appropriate threshold was found to be 20% above or below the final entry. In this case,
the change would be considered as a P.C. only if the number of repetitions is only one.

Figure 2-10

Plausible correction (case 2)—example

Figure 2-10 shows an example of a missed digit case of a P.C. The typist tried to
insert 2236.2, but instead, he/she initially typed 236.2 missing the digit 2 and later corrected
it.
Case 3: Order of digits were reversed while typing
A very often case of P.C. is typing digits in the wrong order, for example, 34 instead
of 43.

Figure 2-11

Plausible correction (case 3)—example
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Figure 2-11 depicts a case of order of digits being reversed while tying. The user
wanted to type 1243.6, but instead, he/she typed 1234.6.
Case 4: Exact same value was typed twice
The initial inspection of the dataset showed that, in some cases, the exact same
value was entered twice for a single parameter. This happened quite often. A logic was
added in my algorithm to identify this type of P.C., as in Figure 2-12.

Figure 2-12

Plausible correction (case 4)—example

Case 5: Cell was empty at first and was filled in the second entry
Manual inspection revealed some cases where the cell was empty at first, but it was
filled later. A possible reason might be that the VBA script records everything, even a
single click, as an input while nothing was actually entered. The user then inputted the
actual entry, for example as in Figure 2-13. This is a possible situation I considered P.C.

Figure 2-13

Plausible correction (case 5)—example
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Case 6: Digits that are hand-written similarly, if only repeated once, are considered a
P.C.
Another case of P.C. is the numbers that look alike in handwriting can be entered
instead of one another. Test results are usually logged in a paper sheet and are later digitized
into the ITD provided Excel file. It is evident that handwriting would not be similar for all
people, and there is a possibility of typing a digit instead of the actual digit due to their
similarity in handwriting. For instance, 1 might look like 7 or 9 in the handwriting of
various people (Figure 2-14). Another combination can be 6/8/0. In any of these
combinations, it is essential that the number of repetitions must be only one. If the number
of repetitions is more than one, it is more likely to be an S.A. case.

Figure 2-14

Look-wise case of Plausible Correction

Figure 2-15

Plausible correction (case 6)—example

Figure 2-15 shows a change of digit from 6 to 8, which is most probably a P.C.
There is a point of argument here that this can fit in both cases, that the number was
changed deliberately, or a simple look wise mistake has occurred. It is not possible to state
with certainty that this is a P.C. or a S.A. case, since this is a subjective issue. I have
concluded that if the number of changes is more than 1 (more than 1 repetition) the
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likelihood is higher toward S.A., whereas if the number of changes is only one, it aligns
well with the P.C. case. Figure 2-16 shows a case where the changes could have been
categorized as look wise error, but since the number of changes was more than one, this is
no longer considered a P.C. case and it rather falls into a S.A. case.

Figure 2-16

Plausible correction (case 6)—example

Case 7: Difference between two entries is too high
There have been some cases where the difference between two successive entries
is too high. These incidents can also be differentiated through the percentage calculation.
If the first entry is less than 80% or greater than 120% of the 2nd entry, then the change is
likely a P.C. There might be several reasons for this P.C. case, including reporting a
parameter value for another parameter or reporting the parameter value from one
test/sample to another test/sample.

Figure 2-17

Plausible correction (case 7)—example

Figure 2-17 is a clear example of a large difference between successive entries,
which can be considered as a P.C. Here the 2nd entry was less than 50 percent of the first
case (4655.4 versus 2150.6), so this is most probably a P.C. case.
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Scenarios to Categorize Data Alteration as Suspicious Alteration
Case 1: Changing values in a pattern or following a combination
S.A. cases mostly followed a pattern of change. In most cases, the number of
changes is more than one, and the values are changing by a value of 1/2/10 in the positive
or negative direction.

Figure 2-18

Suspicious alteration (case 1)—example

Figure 2-18 presents a clear indication of a S.A. case. Here, the total number of
changes is 6 times. The value was increased in the first two cases, reduced on the 3 rd and
4th alterations, but then in the final two incidents, it increased again.
Case 2: Decimal values are eliminated.
In some S.A. cases, the digits after the decimal point are eliminated (e.g. Figure 219). In general, this might be a very small change, but even small changes in the sample of
Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) can have high impacts. Therefore, these cases are also considered
as S.A. in my algorithm.

Figure 2-19

Suspicious alteration (case 2)—example
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Case 3: Parameter values were changed but returned to the initial value
A clear case of altering data is presented in Figure 2-20, where the values were
changed but later returned to the original value. Here, initially, the value was entered as
1945.4, which was changed to 1943, but later brought back to 1945.4. Although the value
didn’t change, I considered this as exploring values potentially for the wrong reasons and
labeled it as S.A.

Figure 2-20

Suspicious alteration (case 3)—example

Case 4: Parameters were first assigned a value but finally changed to zero or
removed entirely
There have been times, especially for parameters with small values, that the values
were completely deleted or replaced with a value of zero. For example, in Figure 2-21, for
sample Test(1) the value was set to 0.26 and replaced with zero. I considered this change
as S.A.

Figure 2-21

Suspicious alteration (case 4)—example
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Scenarios to Uncertain Cases: Plausible Correction or Suspicious Alteration
A very interesting finding in my analysis indicated that there were incidents where
the repetitions might fall in either S.A. or P.C. cases, an example of which is shown in
Figure 2-22 (values changing from 4531.5 to 4532.5 and then to 4530.5). The first change
was from 1 to 2, which might be considered P.C. In the second change, the digit 2 was
replaced with 0, which is likely to be a S.A. However, there is enough room for argument
to fit these cases in other categories. But the number of changes can be informative here.
It is unlikely that both cases were a typo, hence this case is considered as S.A.

Figure 2-22

Plausible Correction /Suspicious Alteration (case 1)—example

Impact of time stamp
Although S.A. cases generally occur in a relatively short period of time, I could not
determine a definite relationship between P.C./S.A. cases with time that can be explored in
a computer code (Figures 2-23 ,2-24, 2-25 and 2-26). Both categories have examples where
a change occurred instantly or after some time.

Figure 2-23

Plausible Correction relationship with time—example 1
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Figure 2-24

Plausible Correction relationship with time—example 2

Figure 2-25

Suspicious alteration relationship with time—example 1

Figure 2-26

Suspicious alteration relationship with time—example 2

Results of P.C./S.A. Classification Algorithm
I applied the algorithms explained earlier to all audit data from the available
project’s datasets (separately for entities 1 and 2) to determine P.C. and S.A. cases. For
each project, I determined the number of unique parameters that were altered, and the total
number of times those parameters were altered. I also separated parameters with
major/moderate/minor impacts on pay factor to analyze whether or not one category might
be more susceptible to alteration than others.
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Figure 2-27

Number of occurrences of P.C./S.A. for project #1

Figure 2-27 shows the total number of altered parameters and frequency of
alterations for project #1, as an example. Figure 2-27 shows the entity 1-reported statistics
on the left side and the entity 2-reported statistics on the right side. In this project and for
major parameters in entity 1-reported data, there were a total of 32 unique parameters that
fell within the P.C. cases, and these parameters were changed a total of 66 times (an average
of roughly one change per parameter). I observed a greater number of S.A. cases for the
entity 1-reported major parameters, with a total of 58 parameters being changed 211 times
(an average of roughly 2.5 changes per parameter). The higher average number of changes
for major parameters in the case of S.A. compared to P.C. (2.5 versus 1) implies that there
are some suspicious activities potentially to tune the parameter values to obtain certain
outcomes. For moderate parameters in the P.C. category, 11 unique parameters were
changed 25 times (an average of roughly 1 change per parameter), and in the S.A. category,
18 unique parameters were changed 60 times (an average of roughly 2 changes per
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parameter). Finally, 18 unique minor parameters were changed 37 times for the P.C.
category, and 24 parameters were changed 70 times for the S.A. category. I observed an
interesting scenario in this analysis as the number of changes for S.A. is roughly 2 times
per unique parameter, whereas P.C. cases show roughly 1 change per unique parameter.
While this can be partly an artifact of the devised algorithms, my careful manual
investigation of P.C./S.A. categorized audit data confirm that algorithms are performing
accurately. I attribute this observation to the P.C. cases being unintentional, and if an
error/mistake occurred, it is usually corrected in the second entry. This is, however, quite
different in the S.A. cases due to the potentially intentional nature of the alterations as the
operator seeks a certain outcome and tries to fine tune the reported value to reach the
intended result. The parameters are indeed altered multiple (≥ 2) times, which resulted in
a high number of changes for major/moderate/minor S.A. cases.
A similar trend is observed in the entity 2-reported data for this project. A total of
14 major parameters in the P.C. category was changed 28 times, and 30 major parameters
in the S.A. category were changed 182 times. In the case of moderate parameters in the
P.C. category, 16 parameters were changed 36 times, whereas in the S.A. category 2
parameters were altered 6 times. For minor parameters in the P.C. category, 22 parameters
were altered 45 times, and in the S.A. category 18 parameters were altered 49 times.
Surprisingly, data alteration seems to be less pronounced in the entity 2 data compared to
the entity 1-reported data. My further investigation showed that entity 1-reported values
can be altered to either confirm the entity 2-reported data or to ensure entity 2 data is used
for payment calculation, among other reasons.
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I conducted this analysis on all available projects and reported their results in Table
2-4. Figures 2-28, 2-29 and 2-30 visually depict three example project results (projects #4,
#7, #9).

Figure 2-28

Number of occurrences of P.C./S.A. for project #4

Figure 2-29

Number of occurrences of P.C./S.A. for project #7
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Figure 2-30

Number of occurrences of P.C./S.A. for project #9
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Unique and total number of material testing parameter changes

All changes

Unique changes

Parameters
with minor
impact

All changes

Unique changes

Entity 2
Parameters
with
moderate
impact

All changes

Unique changes

Parameters
with major
impact

All changes

All changes

All changes

Parameters
with minor
impact

Unique changes

Entity 1
Parameters
with
moderate
impact

Unique changes

Parameters
with major
impact

Unique changes

Classification Category

Project
Number

Table 2-4

Project
1

S.A.

58

211

18

60

24

70

30

182

2

6

18

49

P.C.

32

66

11

25

18

37

14

28

16

36

22

45

Project
2

S.A.

94

404

18

53

26

81

26

66

0

0

0

0

P.C.

29

64

14

30

17

41

11

22

0

0

0

0

Project
3

S.A.

2

6

2

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

P.C.

10

20

3

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Project
4

S.A.

31

96

5

13

25

62

93

276

4

22

8

21

P.C.

9

18

4

8

2

4

15

30

6

12

8

16

Project
5

S.A.

19

52

2

5

2

6

39

87

6

12

9

22

P.C.

10

20

1

2

5

10

48

98

18

37

30

63

Project
6

S.A.

25

73

3

9

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

P.C.

11

23

1

2

1

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

Project
7

S.A.

63

303

9

43

9

23

37

151

1

7

7

16

P.C.

17

36

6

12

11

22

16

39

3

7

3

6

Project
8

S.A.

33

138

1

7

6

19

19

77

2

5

5

17

P.C.

13

26

7

14

7

14

13

26

3

6

6

15

Project
9

S.A.

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

3

2

5

2

4

P.C.

5

10

1

2

1

2

2

4

7

14

2

4

Project
10

S.A.

7

28

2

17

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

P.C.

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

S.A.

8

17

1

3

2

4

17

60

10

37

5

19

Project
11

44

Project
12
Project
13
Project
14
Project
15

P.C.

8

16

11

22

4

9

13

28

5

10

4

9

S.A.
P.C.
S.A.
P.C.
S.A.
P.C.
S.A.
P.C.

7
4
0
1
66
20
3
0

17
8
0
2
334
41
21
0

2
3
1
0
7
11
3
2

6
7
2
0
27
22
23
4

1
0
1
0
5
5
1
1

3
0
2
0
14
11
2
2

26
3
0
0
0
0
10
3

56
6
0
0
0
0
49
8

5
2
0
0
0
0
0
2

10
4
0
0
0
0
0
4

3
5
0
0
0
0
0
0

7
10
0
0
0
0
0
0

Application of Machine Learning Algorithms for P.C./S.A. Classification
Several supervised machine learning (ML) algorithms have been used for
classification of Plausible Correction (P.C.) and Suspicious Alteration (S.A.) cases. The
main purpose of this exploratory analysis is to determine whether or not the humandetected patterns in the audit data are verified by the machine. Upon successful
implementation, this adds a level of confidence to my analysis. Statistical techniques and
ML algorithms are widely used for fraud detection in various sectors (Bell and Carcello,
2000; Lin et al., 2003; Caudill et al., 2005; Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Kirkos et al., 2007;
Perols, 2011; Ngai et al., 2011). A supervised machine learning algorithm learns a function
through labeled input data and produces output for new unlabeled data.
In the absence of independent training data for P.C./S.A. classification, I used the
classified data from the previous section to evaluate various ML algorithms. A nonexhaustive list of well renowned and frequently used classification algorithms includes KNearest neighbor, Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, Neural Network, Support Vector
Machine and Discriminant analysis. I successfully applied these algorithms to my datasets
for P.C./S.A. classification purpose. These algorithms provide valuable insights to my
analysis by assessing their suitability for the detection of suspicious activities in material
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testing reports. Here, I briefly introduce the employed ML algorithms, and refer the
interested reader to “the elements of statistical learning” (Hastie et al., 2008) for detailed
information.
Description of the ML algorithms
K-Nearest Neighbor: K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) algorithm performs on the
assumption that similar things occur in close proximity and in groups. A KNN algorithm
generally stores the available scenarios and classifies them based on the similarity measure.
This algorithm is widely used in real-life cases, such as recommender systems for
recommending products on Amazon, movies on Netflix, or videos on Youtube because of
its non-parametric nature that relaxes the need for assumption about the distribution of
data.
Logistic Regression: Logistic regression is ideal for categorical variables. It is
widely used in categorization of spam versus non-spam email, and fraud versus non-fraud
credit card activity, among others. Logistic regression is a classification algorithm used to
assign observations to a discrete set of classes, for example binary cases. This algorithm is
named after the core method of the function, which is a logistic sigmoid function. This
function is basically an S-shaped curve that can project any real number between the range
of 0 to 1 but cannot reach the limits.
Decision Tree/Random Forest: Decision tree is a proper machine learning model
for both classification and regression. The model performs “If this than that” with a certain
condition for the final result. A decision tree model iterates through the dataset for
partitioning data into categories. Random forest is basically a combination of several

46
decision trees. This binary splitting method is very efficient as it can narrow down the
probable options very quickly from a large number of classes.
Neural Network: Neural networks are multi-layer networks of neurons designed
to recognize patterns. The neural network algorithm is modeled loosely after the human
brain. This algorithm mimics the operation procedure of a human brain to identify the
relationships in a set of available data. One excellent aspect of the neural network is its
ability to adapt to changing inputs. Neurons in a neural network represent a mathematical
function, which is responsible for collecting and classifying information based on the
requirement of the user. The neural network consists of multiple layers of interconnected
nodes.
Support Vector Machine: Support vector machine (SVM) algorithms typically
find a hyperplane that can efficiently distinguish between data points. This hyperplane is
termed as the decision boundary, and anything falling on one side of this line is considered
one group. SVM models can solve both classification and regression problems. They use a
technique called “kernel trick” for transforming data, from which the hyperplane is
detected.
Discriminant Analysis: Discriminant analysis is a supervised machine learning
technique used for dimensionality reduction. Ideally, this algorithm is used to classify
between two or three classes and separate project features from a higher dimension to a
lower order dimension. The generic concept of a discriminant analysis model is very
similar to a principal component analysis, but through the discriminant analysis axes that
maximizes the separation between multiple classes is found.
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Data Preprocessing for ML Algorithms
For the ML algorithms to perform successfully, a large data set is generally
required. The bigger the training dataset is, the superior the model learning, and thereby,
the higher the model performance would be. None of the project datasets was big enough
and typically had 300/400 rows of instances. I, therefore, enlarged the dataset by combining
all the entity 1-reported project data. Similarly, the entity 2 dataset was also combined for
all the projects. Thereby I created two datasets that were sufficient to train the ML models.
Data were preprocessed before being fed into the ML algorithms. Figure 2-31
represents the original format of the dataset after removing the non-repeated cases. For ML
purposes, all repeated parameter values are required to be presented row-wise. For this
purpose, all the repeated values of a certain parameter in a certain test are presented in
adjacent columns, as shown in Figure 2-32.

Figure 2-31

Repeated data points to be used for training ML algorithms (original
format)

Figure 2-32

Row-wise rearranged data (first step preprocessing for ML)
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We also need to create a consistent dataset, meaning each row (one parameter for
one test) should have the same number of columns. However, a parameter value might be
repeated once and another might be repeated five times. To create a consistent matrix
format, we need to consider the maximum number of repetitions for all parameters. In case
a parameter has fewer repetitions that the maximum number of repetitions, the last value
was copied in the remaining columns (Figure 2-33).

Figure 2-33

Matrix formatted data

For example, in Figure 2-33, I noticed that the maximum number of repetitions for
a certain parameter in a test project is 8 (simply an example project), hence, we need a total
of nine values (columns) for each row (parameter). When I put all projects together for the
ML application, the number of columns increases to 23 for entity 2-reported data and 29
for entity 1-reported data. Alongside the maximum number of changes, I also counted the
actual number of changes for each cell. This was also provided in an extra column. The
very first row in Figure 2-33, for example, shows mass of bowl ($U$32) for Test(17) has
only one repetition, so there are only two values for this parameter. We need seven more
values to fill up the matrix. Hence, the last value was copied to the remaining seven
columns (titled “value”) for mass of bowl ($U$32). This was applied to all parameters.
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Although my human-based effort to include time and date of data entry failed to
detect a conclusive pattern, I examined whether or not such pattern in evident to the
machine. To this end, date that was originally in the mm/dd/yyyy format and time, were
converted to timestamp format in order to obtain a unique value. Now we can use the date
and time information as a feature in ML application.

Figure 2-34

Conversion of Date &Time to the timestamp format

Similarly, the effect of parameter on the pay factor (major/minor/moderate) was an
important feature to help the ML algorithms classify repetitions to P.C./S.A. The
categorical data type was required to be converted to numerical format. Label encoding,
which is a powerful tool that can convert the categorical/text data into numerical data, was
used for this purpose.
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Figure 2-35

Label encoded parameter effects

This approach assigned values of 0, 1, 2 to major/moderate/minor categories,
respectively. Although the label encoder successfully converted the categorical data to
numerical data, the ML algorithm would assume the categorical data with higher integer
value is greater/more important than others. So, another method, “one hot encoding” was
used to solve this issue by turning the categorical numbers to binary vectors. One hot
encoder creates a vector with three binary digits. Value of 1 in the first column represents
major parameters, whereas value of 1 in the second and third columns represent minor and
moderate parameters, respectively, as shown in Figure 2-36.
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Figure 2-36

One hot encoded vectors for effect types

Finally, since parameters are on different scales, we need to normalize the data to
ensure certain parameter values do not spuriously impact the outcome. So, the standard
scalar function of python was used to normalize all the data. The standard scalar function
assumes the data to be normally distributed and scale them such that the data is now
centered around 0 and with a standard deviation of 1. The final dataset is similar to that of
Figure 2-37. I then divided the total dataset into two parts. One for the training purpose and
the other part for the evaluation. I used 2/3 of the data for training purposes and 1/3 for
testing purposes.
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Figure 2-37

Normalization of the data for training ML algorithms

Evaluation of ML algorithms
Once the training and test datasets are prepared, I trained various ML models and
evaluated their performance using the accuracy score function of “scikit learn” toolbox in
python. I have used the sigmoid activation function and adam optimizer to train the neural
network model. For the loss function, I used the “binary crossentropy” which is compatible
with sigmoid. This type of loss function is ideal for binary classification tasks. For the
logistic regression, I have used the L2 or ridge regression as a penalty. Ridge regression
adds “squared magnitude” of coefficient and penalty term to the loss function. This
technique helps to avoid overfitting. For the k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm, I used a
neighbor value of 5, which yielded the best result in my prediction. These functions
compare predicted P.C./S.A. with the training and test data. The performance of selected
models for entity 1 and entity 2 data are listed in Tables 2-5 and 2-6, respectively. I also
conducted this analysis on each project separately, which showed that every single project
does not provide enough information to train the ML models (not shown here). It is
noteworthy that the entity 2 dataset had a total of 737 sample data points (rows or in other
words unique parameters). Parameters were changed up to a maximum of 22 times in the
entity 2-reported data, meaning the 23rd value was the final reported value. Similarly, on
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the entity 1 side, there were a total of 892 sample points (unique parameters) changing up
to a maximum of 28 times.
Table 2-5
datasets

Performance of supervised ML algorithms on combined entity 1
Supervised ML model
K-Nearest Neighbor
Logistic Regression
Decision Tree/Random Forest
SVM (Linear)
Discriminant Analysis
Neural Network

Table 2-6
datasets

Accuracy Score
69%
69%
66%
73%
72%
39%

Performance of supervised ML algorithms on combined entity 2
Supervised ML model
K-Nearest Neighbor
Logistic Regression
Decision Tree/Random Forest
SVM (Linear)
Discriminant Analysis
Neural Network

Accuracy Score
69%
69%
66%
72%
72%
39%

All models, except for Neural Network, generally perform at an acceptable level,
with the best model (SVM) resulting in an accuracy of 73% and 72% for entity 1- and
entity 2-reported data. In both cases, the neural network had the lowest accuracy score of
39%. The performance of SVM and Discriminant Analysis models is at an acceptable level
given the complexity of the data, and in the presence of potential outlier information in the
reported data. Moreover, different projects had to be merged to generate a large enough
dataset for ML applications, which resulted in merging non-homogeneous data from
various projects. All in all, I pose that ML algorithms performed successfully, confirming
that the human detected logics are also differentiable with machine.
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Conclusion
The construction industry is exigent for national opulence and growth. It boosts the
economy and augments the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In any developed or
developing country, both public and private owned construction sectors play a pivotal role
in the growth of the country. The devastating impression of suspicious activities and
alteration in reported data can impose turmoil between the government agencies and
contractors. This also refutes the perception of the construction industry in front of the
general public.
QC/QA is an integral step to ensure the quality of the HMA construction works.
This statistics-based approach has been followed by state highway agencies for quite a
period now. However, there are some concerns about representativeness of the reported
material testing data. My study focused on potential data alteration during the QC/QA
processes. This has a significant impact; as potential alterations on the reported data can
jeopardize the quality of asphalt pavements and cause overpayment on HMA projects.
Through this research, I analyzed an audit dataset of material testing reports that
registered all value entries in the Excel reporting files. The series of changes in parameter
values can shed important insights on the potential sources of discrepancies that are
observed between contractor test results and those of the transportation departments and
the mix design. I first manually analyzed all the provided instances of changes in the
parameter values, and determined the general patterns in data reporting. I categorized these
instances to two general categories of Plausible Correction (P.C.)

and Suspicious

Alteration (S.A.). I then developed logic-based computer algorithms to automatically
classify all instances of parameter value changes to P.C. and S.A. I then rigorously
evaluated the automatic classification results to evaluate computer algorithms’
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performance. My results show that a total of 595 and 316 unique parameters were changed
2,268 and 660 times that can be categorized as S.A. and P.C., respectively, in entity 1reported data. For entity 2-reported data, a total of 387 and 280 unique parameters were
changed 1,266 and 587 times that can be categorized as S.A. and P.C., respectively. My
results indicated that major parameters were altered four to five times on average per
parameter. Parameter values for plausible correction cases were mostly changed one time.
I also successfully prompted supervised machine learning technique to detect S.A.
instances from P.C. cases. Given the unavailability of independent labeled data, I utilized
the categorized data from my logic-based analysis to train the ML algorithms. Supervised
ML algorithms like Support Vector Machine and Discriminant Analysis, achieving
accuracy levels of more than 70%, parades well harmony with the logic-based categorized
results.
My findings emphasize the necessity of an advanced cumulative approach to
improve QC/QA process. A better approach is needed to remove probable unethical course
of actions and bring more rigor to QC/QA analysis.

56
References
Al-Khayat, H., Gurganus, C., Newcomb, D. E., and Sakhaeifar, M. S. (2020). Developing
Specification Limits for Hot Mix Asphalt Properties and Impact on Pay Factors.
Journal of Transportation Engineering Part B: Pavements, 146(3), 1–8.
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). (2010). Report to the nations on
occupational fraud and abuse. Accessed at:
https://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/rttn2010.pdf, retrieved on August 1, 2020.
Atwood, J. A., Robinson-Cox, J. F., and Shaik, S. (2006). Estimating the Prevalence and
Cost of Yield-Switching Fraud in the Federal Crop Insurance Program. American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(2), 365–381.
Bagli, C. V. (2018). Investigators Eye Possible $100 Million Construction Fraud. The New
York Times. Accessed at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/nyregion/bloomberg-interior-constructionfraud.html, retrieved on August 1, 2020.
Bell, T. B., and Carcello, J. V. (2000). A decision aid for assessing the likelihood of
fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing, 19(1), 168–184.
Caudill, S. B., Ayuso, M., and Guillén , M. (2005). Fraud detection using a multinominal
logit model with missing information. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 72(4),
539-550.
Coenen, A. R., Pforr, J. E., Hefel, S. A., and Paye, B. C. (2019). State DOT Implementation
of Statistical Analysis and Percent Within Limits. Transportation Research Record,
2673(2), 583–592.
Craig, G. (2019). Three contractors accused of fraud in billion-dollar school modernization
project. Democrat and Chronicle. Accessed at:
https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/2019/08/27/three-contractorsaccused-fraud-construction-plan-reach-deal-feds/2131956001/, retrieved on August
1, 2020.
De Jong, M., Henry, W. P., and Stansbury, N. (2009). Eliminating corruption in our

57
engineering/construction industry. Leadership and Management in Engineering,
9(3), 105–111.
Dutton, A. (2020). Idaho highway contractors changed records hundreds of times. Then,
they got bonuses. Idaho Statesman. Accessed at:
https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/local/investigations/watchdog/article239690
033.html, retrieved on August 1, 2020.
Gunduz, M., and Önder, O. (2013). Corruption and Internal Fraud in the Turkish
Construction Industry. Science and Engineering Ethics, 19(2), 505–528.
Hand, A. J. T., Nimeri, M. A., Hajj, E. Y., Sebaaly, P. E., West, R. C., Heitzman, M. A.,
Yin, F., Hughes, C. S., and Tayabji, S. (2020). Procedures and Guidelines for
Validating Contractor Test Data. NCHRP Research Report 946, National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2020, Washington, DC: The National
Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25823.
Harvey, I. (2019). Forensic investigation into $80M Bondfield fraud digs deeper. Daily
Commercial News by ConstructConnect. Accessed at:
https://canada.constructconnect.com/dcn/news/government/2019/12/forensicinvestigation-into-80m-bondfield-fraud-digs-deeper, retrieved on August 1, 2020.
Hastie, T., Tibshirani, R., and Friedman, J. (2008). The Elements of Statistical Learning.
Springer Series in Statistics. https://web.stanford.edu/~hastie/Papers/ESLII.pdf
Hewitt, D. (2015). China To Demolish New Skyscraper As Part Of Anti-Corruption
Campaign. International Business Times. Accessed at:
https://www.ibtimes.com/china-demolish-new-skyscraper-part-anti-corruptioncampaign-2225814, retrieved on August 1, 2020.
ITD. (2019). FY20 to FY26: Idaho Transportation Investment Program (ITIP). Accessed at:
https://apps.itd.idaho.gov/Apps/Fund/itip2020/draft/FY20_Draft_itip.pdf, retrieved
on August 1, 2020.
Jain, A., and Shinde, S. (2019). A Comprehensive Study of Data Mining-based Financial
Fraud Detection Research. IEEE 5th International Conference for Convergence in
Technology (I2CT), 2–5.

58
Kirkos, E., Spathis, C., and Manolopoulos, Y. (2007). Data Mining techniques for the
detection of fraudulent ﬁnancial statements. Expert Systems with Applications,
32(4), 995–1003.
Kotsiantis, S., Koumanakos, E., Tzelepis, D., and Tampakas, V. (2006). Forecasting
Fraudulent Financial Statements using Data Mining. International Journal Of
Computational Intelligence, 3(2), 104–110.
Kyriacou, A. P., Muinelo-Gallo, L., and Roca-Sagalés, O. (2015). Construction corrupts:
empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries. Public Choice, 165(1–2), 123–145.
Lin, J. W., Hwang, M. I., and Becker, J. D. (2003). A fuzzy neural network for assessing the
risk of fraudulent financial reporting. Managerial Auditing Journal, 18(8), 657–665.
Markelevich, A., and Rosner, R. L. (2013). Auditor fees and fraud firms. Contemporary
Accounting Research, 30(4), 1590–1625.
Manning, R. (2019). Portland Public Schools Respond To Fraudulent $3 Million
Construction Payment. Oregon Public Broadcasting. Accessed at:
https://www.opb.org/news/article/portland-public-schools-fraud-3-millionconstruction-payment/, retrieved on August 1, 2020.
National Asphalt Pavement Association (NAPA). (n.d.). Market Facts. Accessed at:
https://www.asphaltpavement.org/, retrieved on August 1, 2020.
Newcomb, D. E., Gurganus, C., Al-Khayat, H., Sakhaeifar, M., and Epps, J. A. (2016).
Review Of Oregon Department Of Transportation Asphalt Mix Sprcification, Phase
II, 1–26.
Ngai, E. W. T., Hu, Y., Wong, Y. H., Chen, Y., and Sun, X. (2011). The application of data
mining techniques in financial fraud detection: A classification framework and an
academic review of literature. Decision Support Systems, 50(3), 559–569.
Nordin, R. M., Takim, R., and Nawawi, A. H. (2013). Behavioural Factors of Corruption in
the Construction Industry. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 105, 64–74.
Perols, J. (2011). Financial statement fraud detection: An analysis of statistical and machine
learning algorithms. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 30(2), 19–50.

59
Perols, J. L., and Lougee, B. A. (2011). The relation between earnings management and
financial statement fraud. Advances in Accounting, 27(1), 39–53.
Perols, J. L., Bowen, R. M., Zimmermann, C., and Samba, B. (2017). Finding needles in a
haystack: Using data analytics to improve fraud prediction. The Accounting Review,
92(2), 221–245.
Robertson, L. (2014). Scale of international bribery laid bare by new OECD report.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Accessed at:
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/scale-of-international-bribery-laid-bare-bynew-oecd-report.htm, retrieved on August 1, 2020.
Rodriguez, D., Waite, G., & Wolfe, T. (2005). Global corruption report 2005.
Transportation International.
https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2005_GCR_Construction_EN.pdf
Sohail, M., and Cavill, S. (2008). Accountability to prevent corruption in construction
projects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 134(9), 729–738.
Srivastava, A., Kundu, A., Sural, S., and Majumdar, A. K. (2008). Credit card fraud
detection using Hidden Markov Model. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing, 5(1), 37–48.
West, J., Bhattacharya, M., and Islam, R. (2015). Intelligent Financial Fraud Detection
Practices: An Investigation. In: International Conference on Security and Privacy in
Communication Systems, 186–203.
Zarkada-Fraser, A., and Skitmore, M. (2000). Decisions with moral content: Collusion.
Construction Management and Economics, 18(1), 101–111.

60

CHAPTER 3: MONETARY ANALYSIS TO QUANTIFY THE AMOUNT OF
ECONOMIC LOSS DUE TO DATA ALTERATION
Abstract
The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) is responsible for collecting material
testing data from Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) projects across Idaho to evaluate their quality
through statistical quality control/quality assurance (QC/QA) assessment. ITD conducted
a forensic investigation on contractor reported QC data, where only 26% of the contractor
results were in good agreement with the ITD-produced test results. This pointed out the
question of suspicious alterations in material testing data. ITD incorporated a VBA macro
into the material testing report Excel files, which recorded every instance of parameter
value entry. These files provided a sequence of value changes for many parameter values.
This change in material testing data can originate from operator/equipment error as well as
intentional/unintentional data alteration in an HMA project. In any form, those
error/mistakes risk the quality of the end product and can cause monetary loss. In this
chapter, I analyzed the monetary impact of such data alteration and calculated the payments
with and without data alterations. A majority of the analyzed projects showed a significant
over-payment due to data alterations. My analysis also showed that in the absence of data
alteration, only one third of the lots, for which audit data was available, would pass the
percent within limit thresholds – i.e. were at an acceptable level.
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Introduction
State highway agencies have adopted the use of QC/QA specifications programs
for the construction of asphalt pavement in recent decades (Butts and Ksaibati, 2002). This
specification is adopted to ascertain better performing and long-lasting roadways through
decreasing the deviation in asphalt production materials from the design level. The
Transportation Research Board (TRB) has defined QC/QA as the combination of end result
specifications, and materials and methods specifications. QA specifications in general
represent the quality level in statistical terms i.e. mean, standard deviation, percent within
limits, among others (Akkinepally & Attoh-okine, 2006). Departments of transportation
(DOTs) usually cover numerous projects, and usually lack the needed resources to conduct
QA analyses in house, and hence hire third-party contractors to conduct QA testing
(Coenen et al., 2019). The statistical specifications of QC/QA are prone to multiple errors
which can occur both intentionally and unintentionally. Individual personnel or equipment
can potentially lead to unexpected errors, and intentional statistical parameter/material data
alteration can pursue certain goals. The target of this work was to quantify the financial
impacts of data alterations in HMA projects. While I refrain from using fraud for the
detected suspicious data alterations in this study, given that a pure data mining approach is
not able to detect/classify fraud, I provide a brief literature review on fraudulent activities
in various sectors in the following paragraph. This helps in putting a worst case from this
research scenario – which might or might not have materialized – into broader context.
Fraud and financial crime negatively impact a variety of sectors and people,
ranging from the public to investors (Perols, 2011), and hence have attracted a great deal
of attention in recent times (Ngai et al., 2011). With the advancement of technology and
digitization of the paper-based financial works, contrary to expectations, fraudulent
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activities associated with financial statements have significantly increased (Coutorie,
1995). Financial fraud detection is cardinal for preventing grave consequences of
fraudulent activities. The complex nature of financial fraud, however, makes it challenging
to prevent such incidents (Salem, 2012). Data mining and artificial intelligence have been
widely used as anomaly detection methods, finding interesting patterns and hidden truth in
an ever-increasing amount of available data, to detect, deter and prevent fraudulent
activities (Frawley et al., 1992; Turban et al., 2007; Bose and Mohapatro, 2011).
The construction industry is widely known for its association with corruption and
fraud, due to its complex and heterogenous nature, as well as complicated involvement of
third-party contractors (Gunduz and Onder, 2013). The global construction market is worth
around 3,200 billion USD per year (Sohail and Cavill, 2008), and this huge flow of money
makes this sector vulnerable and prone to fraudulent activities. Corruption in construction
is remarkably active at various stages, ranging from selection of contractors, ordering
construction materials, and bribing officials to pass substandard works and manipulating
construction data to increase payment, among others (Sohail and Cavill, 2008). Corruption
in public construction projects are believed to be more prevalent, and also detrimental, in
developing countries because of resource limitation and deficiency in institutional capacity
to detect and prevent fraud (Hardoon and Heinrich, 2011). Several factors like the
uniqueness of the project, intense competition between contractors, several and often
inconsistent levels of bureaucracy for obtaining official approvals, and flexibility in project
delays and overruns contribute to prevalence of fraudulent activities in the construction
sector and thereby cause suboptimal project deliverables (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Bowen
et al., 2007).
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Corruption and fraud in the construction industry can negatively impact the desired
objectives in various ways, including but not limited to, cost overruns, poor quality, less
efficient project selection, and increasing maintenance costs (Kenny, 2006, 2009; Kyriacou
et al., 2015). Financial fraud analysis is still a new and underexplored aspect of the
construction sector. Most of the literature has focused on blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement, increased project costs, and tendering uncertainty (Sohail and Cavill, 2008;
Le et al., 2014; Locatelli et al., 2017). Other forms of financial fraud, like credit card fraud,
corporate fraud, telecommunications fraud, and money laundering, however, have the
focus of much research and analysis in recent times (Ngai et al., 2011).
I received a unique dataset of material testing reports for Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA)
construction projects in Idaho, that recorded every instance of data entry in the Excel
reporting file. Data recording was conducted in the background with a VBA code, and was
not apparent to the data reporting personnel. This provided a series of data entry for some
material testing parameters, which show data alteration in many parameters. It is expected
that each parameter be reported as observed, and hence being reported only once, although
typographical errors may result in multiple entries for some parameters. The patterns
observed in some parameters in the audit data, however, cannot be simply explained as
typographical errors. As described in Chapter 2, I applied a series of logic-based algorithms
to categorize all instances of multiple (more than 1) data entry as either Plausible
Correction (P.C.) or Suspicious Alteration (S.A.). I refrain from using a blanket statement
of “fraudulent activities”, as a mere data mining approach may not justify categorizing all
suspicious changes in the reported data as fraud. However, I pose that S.A. instances cannot
simply and readily be explained as typographical errors or other forms of mistakes.
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The aim of this study is to analyze the financial repercussions and impacts of S.A.
instances. It is plausible that data alterations can occur for monetary benefit or
personal/institutional advantage. Suspicious alterations may also have been done to obtain
bonus payments, avoid repetition of faulty tests and works, and pass substandard work.
Scope of Work
The scope of the current work was to calculate the monetary loss that occurred in
HMA pavement projects due to alterations in material testing reports. In the previous
chapter, I differentiated the Suspicious Alteration (S.A.) instances from the Plausible
Correction (P.C.) cases for multiple data entry values in volumetric testing reports. This
chapter will demonstrate the economic impact of S.A. cases. I calculated the required
financial payment to contractors if only the first acceptable instance of S.A. data entry was
used, and compared it to the project payment based on the reported values (final S.A.
instances). I considered the last entry for all P.C. instances and adopted the final reported
values for the missing parameters. The basic procedure was to go through the exact same
calculation procedures followed by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) for
monetary calculation, quantify the payment-related parameters and associated payment for
each lot in each project. To avoid inherent bias during the monetary analysis, this thesis
uses the names “Entity 1” and “Entity 2” to refer to agency and contractor data, not
necessarily in the same order. In other words, it has not been disclosed to the reader whether
Entity 1 represents data from the agency or contractor. The same is the case for Entity 2.
Monetary Calculation
ITD has a certain set of rules to determine how a contractor will be paid for a Hot
Mix Asphalt (HMA) project. Several input parameters, like Mass of Bowl, Mass Pan and
Initial Sample, and Calibration factor, are calculated while performing an HMA project.
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Once a test is completed, test results are grouped as lots based on pre-specified lot
calculation rules. Payment is finally calculated per lot. The required input parameters are
translated into a group of asphalt mix design properties such as Gmm (Theoretical maximum
specific gravity), Gmb (Bulk specific gravity), Pa (Air voids), VMA (Voids in the mineral
aggregate), and VFA (Voids filled with asphalt), among others. These mix design
properties are then used as acceptance criteria at the start of the production. Out of these
calculated mix design properties, three variables, namely Air voids, VMA, and Mainline
Density (Percent compaction), are used for final payment calculation. All the project data
that we received were from before 2020, so the calculation procedure is from earlier ITD
payment conventions.
Fig. 3-1 illustrates the overall representation of the generic input parameters tested
in the lab/plant and later converted to mix design properties. These Excel sheets are
identified as “ITD-0777” form. The input parameters are shown on the left-hand side, and
the calculated mix design properties are located on the right-hand side. Generally, these
calculations are done for two samples (Sample 1A and Sample 1B), which are then
averaged, and the combined values of Air voids, VMA, and Mainline Density (Percent
Compaction) are used for payment calculation.
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Figure 3-1

Typical data input file for asphalt pavement projects

Once the payment-related parameters are calculated for each test, tests are grouped
to form a lot, and payments are calculated based on some statistical tests on the lot data
(details later).
Lot Grouping: Payment factors are calculated for each lot, but based on F and T
tests from a group of tests that might include several lots. Grouping is done to enhance the
diagnostic power of F and T tests. If the group consists of only one lot, then payment is
calculated for that individual lot, whereas if the lot group has multiple lots then payment is
calculated for all the lots together. ITD has set certain defining formulas to group the lots
for payment. For each lot, a few parameters define payment related calculations including
“Start of evaluation range” (lot number from where the evaluation would start) and “End
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of evaluation Range” (lot number for which the payment would be calculated). For
example, in Fig. 3-2, for lot 2, the evaluation range started from lot 2 and also ended at 2.
So, for this lot, no other lot is grouped for payment calculation. For lot 6, the evaluation
started at lot 4 and ended at 6. So, all the tests from lots 4, 5, and 6 would be grouped
together for payment calculation of lot 6.

Figure 3-2

Lot evaluation range for payment calculation

Test Statistics: Mean and standard deviation value for Air Voids, VMA, and
Mainline Density of a lot group both from the entity 1 and the entity 2-reported data are
calculated first. From those values, a pass/fail test check is done using F & T tests. If pvalues for both Air Voids and VMA are below 0.05, then they pass the test. So, we have
two p-values from the F test for Air Voids and VMA. Similarly, there is another p-value
check for T test for both parameters. If data are passed based on both F and T tests for both
Air Voids and VMA, then the project lot gets a green signal, and entity 2 data is selected
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for payment. If in any of these tests, p-value exceeds 0.05 (rejected), then the test fails, and
the entire lot is rejected for payment based on the entity 2 data; instead, the entity 1-reported
data is selected for calculating payment factor.
Determination of Percent Within Limits (PWL): The next step of the calculation
of payment factor is the determination of PWL values. The lot average Air Voids, VMA,
and Mainline Density values are considered, and through a series of calculations, PWL
values are measured. The final payment factor for all three payment affecting parameters
is computed through the following equation (3-1).
𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =

55+0.5×𝑃𝑊𝐿
100

(3-1)

The final payment value is then computed for the lot, using:
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑡 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒

(3-2)

Here, “Quantity represented by lot” is the total volume of asphalt pavement
produced in the lot and “Contract unit price” is the unit price to be paid to the contractor.
Formation of Input Data for Monetary Calculation
I created two sets of data: first and last reported S.A. value, which will subsequently
be used for monetary impact analysis. My hypothesis is that the first “acceptable” S.A.
value is the original value that was measured for that parameter, whereas the last value is
the final reported value after alterations. The difference in payment calculations for these
two cases is assumed to be the monetary loss to suspicious activities in the material testing
reports. As a reminder, we have three types of data: non-repeated data (one value is
reported) and repeating data with P.C. and S.A. categorization (multiple data entry were
recorded for each parameter). Since only the S.A. data can be held responsible for any sort
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of economic impact, I have selected first and last entry of the S.A. cases. The P.C. and nonrepeated cases don’t have any influence on the monetary value, so they adopted their
reported values. Also, any missing parameter value is assigned its reported value.

Figure 3-3

Classified Plausible Correction (P.C.) and Suspicious Alteration (S.A.)
data

As an example, in Fig. 3-3, cell $U$62 (Submerged weight of puck in water
(specimen 1)) from test Test(16) has three repetitions with a total of four values and falls
in the S.A. category. Hence, the first value of 2804.2 was selected for my first dataset (that
will be used for original payment calculation) and the last value of 2808.2 was selected for
the second dataset (that will be used for payment calculation after alterations). Cell $U$63
(Weight of puck SSD (specimen 1)) from Test(10) falls in the P.C. category. So, I picked
the final value of 4823 for both datasets. For non-repeated cells, the single corresponding
value was kept for both datasets.
A Python code was generated to accomplish these steps. The code is designed to
adopt the first and last values of S.A. and to take the last value of P.C. from the previously
categorized audit data, and to take the final reported value for all non-repeating and missing
variables. A sample of the newly generated dataset is presented in Fig. 3-4. I included tests
on the rows and parameters/cells associated with each test in the columns.
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Figure 3-4
Input dataset for monetary calculation: rows show test number and
columns represent parameter values associated with each test
This step was associated with some challenges. There were instances in which the
first or last S.A. and last P.C. data had an empty cell, which precluded us from calculating
monetary values. These empty cells created unreasonably large, negative or not-a-number
(NaN) values for my target parameters (Air Voids/VMA/Mainline Density). Hence, I
devised some strategies to fill empty values. For the first entry, if the value was empty, I
selected the second cell value; if the second was empty, I looked for the next one and
continued until I found a value. A similar process was done for obtaining the value of last
cell but in a reverse order. I plugged the cell value before the last cell if the last one was
empty. I continued these steps from the last cell backwards until I found a value. Fig. 3-5
demonstrates a missing first entry for cell $U$37 (Submerged weight of bowl and sample
(increment 1)), for which the next value was adopted.
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Figure 3-5

Figure 3-6

Empty cell for some parameters

Effect of empty/NaN cells on calculated payment parameters

Fig. 3-6 demonstrates an example problem associated with having a NaN value for
an input parameter. Because we had missing values for one of the cells, several calculations
were not possible and resulted in NaN value for Air Voids. Since secondary parameter
values (payment-related parameters) depend on various primary parameters, lack of
primary parameter values will preclude calculation of secondary values.
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This final dataset was used to test and apply the formulas from “ITD-0777” to
evaluate the monetary values (payments based on first and last S.A. values). A code was
prepared in Matlab in this step, which replicated the original calculation flow of the “ITD0777” file and extracts the Air Voids, VMA, and Mainline Density values. To ensure the
accuracy of the calculations, another code was prepared at this step to plug in the parameter
values directly into the “ITD-0777” file. This enabled me to calculate the parameter values
both from the coded program and from the “ITD-0777” file. I cross-checked several
projects to ensure the calculated monetary values through my code and “ITD-0777” file
were exactly matching. The direct monetary calculation through my code was much faster
as it could automatically produce all the test parameters of a project. Figure 3-7
demonstrates the calculation of Air voids and VMA values for each test of a sample project
through the direct calculation in my code. Similar values were obtained from the “ITD0777” file.
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Figure 3-7

Calculated Air voids (column 2) and VMA (column 3) for an example
project
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Figure 3-8

Calculation of Air voids and VMA through ITD-0777 file

Fig. 3-8 shows an example “ITD-0777” file where all the input values have been
inserted, and calculations were done by the internal formulas of this sheet. Since this
procedure is lengthy and can only be done for one test at a time, the developed code that
replicates “ITD-0777” file was used for the remainder of my analysis. However, I randomly
selected 3 tests from each project to cross-check individual test results with the previously
discussed code produced results.
Unavailability of Audit Files: Unfortunately, we didn’t have the audit files for all
projects. On many occasions, the audit files didn’t have the recorded values for all the tests
of a project. Sometimes there were no audit files for neither entity 1 nor entity 2-reported
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data. Since we need data both from both entities, I considered the reported values from the
project files where audit values were missing.

Figure 3-9

Total number of tests done for an example project (Project 1)
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Figure 3-10

Available tests in the audit file for an example project

Project #1 shown in Fig. 3-9 has a total of 101 reported tests from the entity 1reported data, while in the audit file we only have data for 52 tests (Fig. 3-10). All tests in
audit file from Test(1) to Test (50) were missing except for Test (47). For the monetary
calculations, I used the reported values for the missing tests. The reported values were
exactly the same in both input datasets, so they did not induce any monetary difference.
But the available tests from the audit file showed a significant difference in the monetary
values (shown later).
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Although I successfully filled the empty cells and missing audit values with the
reported ones, I faced some issues while trying to calculate the pay factor parameters. I
found negative and unreasonably large secondary parameter values based on the first S.A.
primary parameters. Fig. 3-11 shows an example attempted monetary parameter
calculation, where I observed large negative Air Voids values even after removing all the
empty cells from the input parameter set.

Figure 3-11

Calculated negative Air voids value

I investigated the sources of those negative and unreasonably big values by
referring back to the ITD-0777 source file. It is noteworthy that it takes around 10-15
minutes to write the input values to the Excel file (done automatically with a Python code
on a laptop) and generate Air Voids/VMA values for a single test. Through trial and error,
I was able to discover the reasons for those unusual values, which are presented under
different cases as shown below.
Case1: The first case that was borne out of my investigation was an input that was
unreasonably smaller than an ideal value for a parameter (Figs. 3-12 and 3-13). Fig. 3-12
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shows that mass of bowl for increment 1 has a value that was far lower than its ideal value,
whereas the value for increment 2 was much closer to its ideal value. The smaller input
resulted in a large negative Air voids value. Similarly, on other occasions, with lower
inputs, I observed positive Air voids values, but the value was unreasonably large.

Figure 3-12

Calculated negative Air voids value due to unreasonably small
primary parameter
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Figure 3-13

Calculated unreasonable Air voids and VMA values from
unreasonably small input

Case2: In some tests, I observed unreasonably large primary parameter values
producing unreasonable secondary parameters (Fig. 3-14). For example, the mass of bowl
for increment 2 was 22,290, which was much higher than the ideal value (2,290). This
directly affected the Air Voids calculation, which took a value that was much higher than
expected. The value of 22,290 was a typing error value, which in this case, was the last
typing error value. The audit file recorded this value as the final reported value, which
obviously cannot be used for monetary calculation. In this case, I either adopted the
previous/succeeding reasonable parameter value from the audit file, or if this was not
possible (e.g. for plausible corrections), I took the final reported value for this parameter.
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Figure 3-14

Calculated higher unreasonable Air voids and VMA value from a
large input value

Case 3: Some audit values were exactly the same for multiple cells (Fig. 3-15).
This was probably due to the wrong input by a data entry person. A possible explanation
can be that while the operator was trying to insert the values for a cell, they probably put
the value in an adjacent cell. For example, the submerged weight of bowl and sample and
the submerged weight of bowl both were set as 1,367.6, which resulted in a value of 0 for
the weight of sample.
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Figure 3-15

Calculated negative Air voids value due to similar values inserted for
adjacent cells

Case 4: In some occasions, the later value (e.g. mass of bowl and sample) was
smaller than the first value (e.g. mass of bowl), which is obviously not reasonable. Fig. 316 shows such an example for which a test had a mass of bowl value higher than the mass
of bowl and sample, which resulted in a large negative Air Voids value.
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Figure 3-16

Calculated negative Air voids value due to mass of bowl and sample
being less than mass of bowl

Test and Lot Information: For the purpose of calculating the monetary value as
well as removing unreasonable values, we need the Test and Lot information. From the
“Testing Summary” sheet of ITD-0777 file (reported material testing data), I retrieved all
the Tests and Lot information about each project (Fig. 3-17).
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Figure 3-17

Lot and test information for a test project

Parameter Values for Missing Tests: There were several tests where we didn’t
have any value from the audit file. For the sake of the monetary analysis, we need values
for all tests of a project. Hence, I replaced all the missing values with recorded values prior
or after the missing value in the audit file, or if not available, with the final reported values.
It is more often that final reported values (those that were formally used for payment
calculation) were used to replace missing values.
Removing Unreasonable Parameter Values: The first and last entry for S.A. and
the last entry of P.C. from audit files were unreasonable on some occasions. In order to
remove them and only select reasonable values, I enforced multiple conditions through the
following steps:
i.

All the reported and audit values were taken for a parameter. For example, all values
$U$32 (mass of bowl) for a project was considered as a list.
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ii.

Missing values from the list were removed at the first step.

iii.

There were a couple of outlier values in some lists. For example, from the
aforementioned case 1, a value of 22 was unreasonable for $U$32 (mass of bowl).
This outlier value was removed using the Matlab’s “rmoutlier” function. This
removed any value that was outside three standard deviations range from the
median.

iv.

I noticed that “rmoutlier” did not remove all the unreasonable values, hence, I put
a second criterion in place. If a value was greater than 1.2×mean or lower than
0.8×mean then it was removed. This threshold is set by expert opinion, and was
manually checked for all tests in all projects to ensure its validity.

v.

Some reasonable values, however, were removed through the process of step iv. In
order to reintroduce the reasonable values to the list, the range of final reported
values for each parameter was checked (Fig. 3-18). If a removed parameter value
fell within this range, it was reintroduced in the final list.

Figure 3-18

Lower and upper limit value for parameters
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After completing all these steps, the desired dataset (two sets of parameter values,
i.e. first and last S.A. values, for all tests) was finally ready for calculating the secondary
parameters (Air voids/VMA/Mainline Density) that are used for monetary analysis.
Although I removed the unreasonable values there is still the possibility of getting
smaller/larger/negative secondary parameter values for first S.A. entry. This is probably
another reason why the data was altered to match with the ideal ranges for Air Voids (2-4)
and VMA (12-16). Figs. 3-19, 3-20, 3-21 show cases in which even seemingly reasonable
values of primary parameters resulted in secondary parameter values that do not fall in the
acceptable range.

Figure 3-19

Unreasonable calculated Air voids and VMA with reasonable primary
parameter values
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Figure 3-20

Unreasonable calculated Air voids and VMA with reasonable primary
parameter values

Figure 3-21

Unreasonable calculated Air voids and VMA with reasonable primary
parameter values
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Lot Grouping: Based on the calculated Air Voids/VMA/Mainline Density
parameter values, several lot groupings, that were originally used for monetary
calculations, should have been changed, and many tests should have been rejected in the
first place (Fig. 3-22). However, it’s not possible during my analysis steps to ask for a redo
of the tests in the field and recalculate the secondary parameters, so I considered the lot
grouping as reported.

Figure 3-22

An example case of lot calculated parameters failing the statistical
tests
Results of Monetary Analysis

The final payment-related parameter values were calculated for all tests of each
project and all projects, which are presented here. Detailed results and plots for project #1
are described in this section, and summary results for all projects are presented in a Table
format.
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Figure 3-23

Number of unique P.C./S.A. parameter changes for each lot and each
parameter type for the entity 1-reported data for project #1

Fig. 3-23 presents the number of unique cells that were changed in each lot for
project #1. The graph shows data for three separate categories of major/moderate/minor
parameters for both P.C./S.A. instances. Lot 3, for example, has 5 instances of S.A. and 2
instances of P.C. for major parameters. This graph presents the unique number of
cells/parameters that were affected, not the number of times these cells were changed. The
total number of times these cells were changed was much higher because each cell was
changed multiple times.
I observed the maximum number of S.A. for major parameters in lot 15 (Fig. 3-23).
It will be shown later that frequency of S.A. parameters does not necessarily have a
monotonic relationship with payment, rather changes might be due to a variety of reasons
including passing Percent Within Limits (PWL) or precision criteria.
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Figure 3-24

Number of unique P.C/S.A. parameters for entity 2 tests for project
#1

I did not observe any direct relationship between the number of P.C. or S.A.
changes in entity 1- reported versus the entity 2-reported data. Both datasets are prone to
having multiple parameter value changes.
Before performing the monetary analysis, these primary parameters are checked for
precision level in Gmm (Theoretical maximum specific gravity), Gmb (Bulk specific gravity),
and Pb (Asphalt binder content, percent by total mass of mixture) parameters. One of the
precision checks is shown in the Fig. 3-25, where Gmm precision didn’t pass (results as No)
for this example test. For project #1, I presented the precision results for each test both on
the entity 1 and entity 2 data in Fig. 3-26 (green: pas – red: fail). Multiple tests didn’t pass
the precision test.
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Figure 3-25

Precision criterion not satisfied for an example project
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Figure 3-26

Precision criterion for each test of project #1 (upper entity 1, lower
entity 2). Green shows pass and red represents fail.

Acceptance Check
Monetary analysis starts with two statistical tests (F and T tests) to determine
whether entity 1-reported data should be used, or the entity 2-reported data is to be used.
Then the selected data goes through the “quality level analysis” for Air
Voids/VMA/Mainline Density which subsequently determines whether or not the lot is at
an acceptable level. Fig 3-27 shows an example graph with Accept (green)/Reject
(red)/Stop Production (black) levels for Percent Within Limits (PWL) for Air Voids, VMA
and Mainline Density for project #1. These checks were done for the first S.A. entry cases
to see if the first value was considered for payment, how many lots should have been
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rejected. This analysis indicates that even before considering payment, several lots might
have been rejected straight away. Usually, for the three payment factor related parameters,
this acceptability check is done with the following generic value check.
𝑃𝑊𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑/ 𝑉𝑀𝐴/ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 > 60 = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑃𝑊𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑/ 𝑉𝑀𝐴/ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 > 40 = 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑃𝑊𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑/ 𝑉𝑀𝐴/ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 < 40 = 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙

Figure 3-27

Acceptance check for payment related parameters

-- Acceptable Level, -- Reject Level, -- Stop Production,
Figure 3-28

Action Needed
Lot-wise Acceptance/Rejection/Stop
production according to Percent
Within Limit (PWL) for project #1

Fig. 3-28 shows that multiple lots might have been rejected based on the PWL
check. The first row presents results for Air Voids, the second row is for VMA, and the
last row is for Mainline Density. Five lots out of the total 17 got rejected in the parameter’s
quality level analysis check. Further, only 6 lots out of the 17 were at an acceptable level.
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I now focus on the monetary analysis of data alterations, based on the first and last
acceptable entry for S.A. cases. In Fig. 3-29, the Green bars show calculated monetary
value for the first acceptable S.A. parameter values. As discussed earlier, for the unchanged
parameter values (no alteration) and for P.C. cases, the reported value and last P.C. value
were selected for monetary analysis, respectively. The red bar shows calculated payment
based on the last entry for S.A. parameters. Yellow bars present the original reported
payment. These payment levels are calculated for each lot separately.

Figure 3-29 Lot-wise payment for project #1. Green bars show payment based on
the first S.A. parameter values, red bars present payment based on last S.A.
parameter values, and yellow bars show the actual payment formally made.
There were some lots for which my final calculated value didn’t match the reported
formal value from the projects. There are two reasons for this observation:
i.

Some of the lots had “dispute resolution” status, which was resolved by collecting
data by a third party. However, we didn’t have any audit data from the third party.
So, my calculated value was different from the originally reported payments.
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ii.

As discussed earlier, audit files did not necessarily record all data entry, meaning
that final reported parameter value might not be included in the audit file. I observed
some instances that the last value recorded in the audit file was not equal to the
reported one. Because of the irregularity of the data in the audit file for some lots,
my calculations did not match the exact reported value in a few cases.
Bars in Fig. 3-29 are labeled as E1 and E2, which represent Entity 1 and Entity 2,

respectively. This shows which reported data was chosen for payment analysis based on
the F and T tests. For lot 2, for example, if the initially reported values were considered,
Entity 1-reported data should have been used for payment, whereas due to alteration, entity
2 data were used for payment. This resulted in an overpayment of around 20,000 dollars
(+20%) for this lot. It is evident in Fig. 3-29 that for several lots payment should have been
less if the initial entry value for parameters was chosen for payment analysis.
There were originally about 30 projects obtained from ITD that had some sort of
audit file included. Out of the 30 projects, however, 18 either were missing audit files or
reported values were unavailable. I hence focused on the 12 projects for which I could
calculate payments. In the rest of this chapter, I will present all results for these projects.
Table 3-1 shows cumulative monetary value based on the first and last S.A.
parameter values and also the final/formal reported payment. This table includes all the
available number of audit tests from entity 1 and entity 2 as well as the cumulative
monetary values for the projects. In most projects, there was a significant amount of
overpayment.
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Total Sheet (Dens)

Available Audit
(Dens)

Payment (First S.A.)

70

70

54

54

21

21

$1,945,217 $2,228,807 $2,260,795

14

67

67

67

67

15

14

$2,492,391 $2,853,563 $3,215,331

5

16

No
Data

16

16

12

5

25

101

51

101

52

27

13

$3,962,182 $4,082,441 $4,217,759

50

241

84

150

12

57

5

$9,860,811 $9,906,251 $9,897,883

21

79

No
Data

74

50

50

33

$1,976,327 $2,030,917 $2,040,929

5

16

16

16

16

10

10

$762,583

$989,563

$989,797

4

14

14

13

11

8

6

$586,866

$709,034

$709,243

3

9

9

9

9

3

3

$195,573

$192,578

$212,967

11

51

No
Data

33

4

13

3

$1,756,489 $1,878,476 $1,952,210

13

25

25

42

42

13

13

$1,117,583 $1,142,740 $1,525,770

17

54

14

51

11

19

6

$1,907,322 $1,906,912 $2,306,717

$568,890

$583,246

Formal Payment
(Reported with
Dispute Resolution)

Available Audit (E1)

17

Payment (Last S.A.)

Total Test (E1)

Available Audit (E2)

Total Test (E2)

Project
1
Project
2
Project
3
Project
4
Project
5
Project
6
Project
7
Project
8
Project
9
Project
10
Project
11
Project
12

Total Lot

Project Number

Table 3-1
Calculated payments for first and last S.A. parameter values, and the
formally paid amount for each project. Table also enlists statistics of total number
of lots and available audit files from the entity 1 and entity 2 reports

$579,831

Table 3-2 summarizes all Percent Within Limit (PWL) results for all projects. This
table provides details about the number of lots in each project, number of lots for which
audit files were available, and number of lots for which audit files are available for both
entity 1 and entity 2. These tables further enlists the number of lots that might have been
rejected (at least based on one parameter, i.e. Air Voids, VMA, or Mainline Density),
accepted or was at stop production level. Projects #8 and #9 did not have even a single lot
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that was accepted (Table 3-2), whereas project #5 had the highest fraction of accepted lot
(90% of all lots). On average, 8-50% of the lots should have been stopped and reformed
the lot/redid the test, which indicates a considerable proportion of the lots would have been
rejected.
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Total Accepted

Total Rejected

Total Stop Production, Action Needed

Accepted (Mutual between E1 & E2)

Rejected (Mutual between E1 & E2

Stop Production, (Mutual between E1 & E2)

7
(50%)

2
(14%)

14

6
(43%)

7
(50%)

2
(14%)

No
data

4
(80%)

0 (0%)

1
(20%)

0

0
(0%)

0 (0%)

0
(0%)

14
to25

1 to
13

20
(80%)

2(8%)

3
(12%)

11

9
(82%)

1 (9%)

1
(9%)

34 to
50

1 to
33

45
(90%)

1 (2%)

4
(8%)

4

3
(75%)

1
(25%)

0
(0%)

Available No of Lot (E2)

6
(43%)

Missed Lot (E1)

6
(46%)

Available No of Lot (E1)

5
(38%)

Total Lot

3
(23%)

Project

13

Project 1

7
(41%)

15

Project 2

5
(29%)

10, 14

14

14

Project 3

6
(35%)

15

5

4

1

No
data

Project 4

12, 15

17

25

12

2 to
13, 21

Project 5

Missed Lot (E2)

Available No of Lots (Mutual between E1 & E2)

Table 3-2
Summary of acceptance/rejection and stop production for PWL
analysis for each project

50

5

2 to 46

14

Project 6

21

12

1 to 7,
11, 19

No
data

No
data

16
(76%)

2
(10%)

3
(14%)

0

0
(0%)

0 (0%)

0
(0%)

Project 7

5

5

0

5

0

1
(20%)

2
(40%)

2
(40%)

5

1
(20%)

2
(40%)

2
(40%)

Project 8

4

4

0

4

0

0
(0%)

3
(75%)

2
(50%)

4

0
(0%)

3
(75%)

2
(50%)

Project 9

3

3

0

2

1

0
(0%)

3
(100%)

1
(33%)

2

0
(0%)

2
(100%)

1
(50%)

Project 10

11

1

1 to 10

No
data

No
data

2
(18%)

2
(18%)

1
(9%)

0

0
(0%)

0 (0%)

0
(0%)

Project 11

13

10

4, 5, 9

8

9 to
13

3
(23%)

9
(69%)

3
(23%)

6

1
(17%)

4
(67%)

2
(33%)

Project 12

98

17

4

5 to 17

5

6 to
17

7
(41%)

6
(35%)

6
(35%)

4

0
(0%)

4
(100%)

2
(50%)
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Table 3-3
Summary of payment change, and number of unique S.A. parameters
involved for each project

Total
major S.A.
unique
parameters

Total
payment
change per
unique major
S.A.
parameter
($/parameter)

Total S.A.
unique
parameters

Total payment
change per
unique S.A.
parameter
($/parameter)

Project
Number

Total
Lot

Total
payment
change ($)
(first and
last S.A.)

Project 1

17

$283,590

60

4,727

103

2,753

Project 2

14

$361,172

94

3,842

138

2,617

Project 3

5

$14,356

0

Project 4

25

$120,258

38

3,165

64

1,879

Project 5

50

$45,440

33

1,377

45

1,010

Project 6

21

$54,590

20

2,729

22

2,481

Project 7

5

$226,980

47

4,829

66

3,439

Project 8

4

$122,168

36

3,394

45

2,715

Project 9

3

$-2,995

1

-2,995

5

-599

Project 10

11

$121,987

7

17,427

9

13,554

Project 11

13

$25,158

14

1,797

23

1,094

Project 12

17

$-409

7

-58

10

-41

0

Table 3-3 summarizes the calculated overpayment for each project, as well as the
average extra payment per unique parameter changed. In this table, the total major S.A.
unique parameters and total S.A. unique parameters represent either entity 1 or entity 2
based on which of them were selected. For example, on lot 1 of a project, either the entity
1 or 2 is selected for payment based on the statistical test results. If entity 1 is selected, then
major S.A. unique and total S.A. unique for entity 1 is considered. Similarly, for lot 2 based
on statistical test results if entity 2 is selected, then the major S.A. unique and total S.A. is
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considered for entity 2. So, the final value of major S.A. unique and total S.A. represented
in this table is a summation of all the lot of a project from either entity 1 or entity 2 based
on which of them were selected on each individual lot. The maximum amount of extra
payment was seen on project #2, where more than $361,000 were overpaid. In this project,
94 major and a total of 138 parameters were altered. The high number of alterations resulted
in a massive monetary change in this project. A majority of the analyzed projects had a
significant amount of overpayment. For some projects (9 and 12) I saw a reduction in
payment, although the sheer value of reduction is minimal. It is also noteworthy that there
were also some lots in different projects for which detected S.A. values resulted in minor
decrease in payment, but for the entire project, the summation of all lots resulted in overpayment. It is also interesting to observe in this table that each S.A. parameter change
resulted in roughly $1,000-$5,000 extra payment in each project. The audit files did not
necessarily capture all changes in reported parameter values, and I expect if those are
factored in, the change in payment can be even higher.
Relationship between S.A. Instances and Payment
An essential question is whether or not data alteration always translated into
financial impacts. The answer is “No”. Although my main objective was to capture the
economic repercussions of data alterations on the projects, I observed that they did not
necessarily translate into monetary changes all the time. Through in-depth analysis, I
investigated the potential reasons for this observation. An overall comparison of the
monetary-related parameter (Air Voids/VMA/Mainline Density) values from the primary
parameters for first S.A. parameter entry and final reported parameter is shown in Fig. 330. The upper part (green) and lower part (red) of Fig. 3-30 present all the test values for
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first S.A. entry and final reported entry for a particular lot in project #7. Looking closely,
most of the test values are different between the two cases (green versus red).

Figure 3-30 Lot-wise calculated Air voids/VMA/Mainline Density parameters
based on first S.A. and final reported parameter values (project #7)
But this is not all that we need for monetary calculation. The next step is to form
the lot groups. This particular lot was grouped with its previous lot (Fig. 3-31). Like the
individual group, this lot group also had evidence of changed value for most of the tests.
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Figure 3-31

Formation of lot group (project #7)

As described earlier, the second step of the financial analysis is to check the
acceptability of the entity 1/entity 2 data through the F and T tests (Fig. 3-32).

Figure 3-32

Selection of entity 1/entity 2 test result based on F and T tests (project
#7)
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It is evident that although there were clear data alteration instances, based on F and
T tests, entity 2 data were used for payment calculations. No matter how many times the
entity 1 data was changed, it doesn’t go into the payment calculation steps.
The next target was to calculate the Unweighted Pay Factor. In this step, the average
value of Air Voids, VMA, and Mainline Density is used. This average value, often, can
compensate for the test value change, hence not resulting in payment change. Some
reported test values were lower than the first S.A. instances, and some were higher. Since
a mean value is taken, we often had a very close overall value from both calculations. For
instance, the average Air Voids value was 3.96 from my first S.A. calculation, whereas it
was 3.97 in the reported section. Similarly, the average VMA value came up as 16.36 from
my first S.A. calculation, and it was reported as 16.30. Despite all the clear alterations done
on the earlier steps, averaged monetary-related parameters can take values very close to
the original values (Fig. 3-33).
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Figure 3-33

Figure 3-34

Calculation of unweighted pay factor (project #7)

Calculation of PWL and monetary value (project #7)
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The last step is to determine the Percent within Limit (PWL) value and calculate
the monetary values (Fig. 3-34). We can see in Figs. 3-32 & 3-33 that because the average
value of the secondary parameters was almost equal; the PWL value came precisely the
same for these specific tests. The end result was, hence, an identical payment value for
both scenarios. I argue that for some cases no matter how many times data alteration has
been done, there might still be zero payment impact. Obviously, this does not apply to all
projects and tests. As shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2, data alteration has often resulted in
overpayment to entity 2.
Conclusion
Construction projects are generally performed in a complex dynamic environment
and are highly sensitive to data alteration and suspicious activities. Failure to take adequate
measures to protect these sensitive tasks against corruption results in higher costs and time
overruns in construction projects. This research leverages the availability of a unique audit
dataset (recording sequence of all entered parameter values in a material testing form) to
calculate monetary impacts of potential suspicious alteration of material testing reports.
Such claim of data alteration upholds the necessity for reformation of traditional QC/QA
practice which seems to be vulnerable to suspicious intentional or unintentional digitalized
data error and can cause loss in monetary values. I have successfully replicated the
monetary payment calculation procedures followed by Idaho Transportation Department
and calculated lot-wise payments for various lots of 12 Hot Mix Asphalt projects prior to
and after data alterations. Majority of the projects prompted overpayment, even with the
conservative approach that was taken for monetary calculations. Further, a great majority
of the analyzed lots did not pass the Percent Within Limit thresholds.
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY, COMCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Summary and Conclusion
This thesis emphasized two specific applied science problems. The first problem
discussed in Chapter 2 featured the significance of suspicious activities in Hot Mix Asphalt
(HMA) construction projects. The objective was to devise a model to display suspicious
activity detection strategies to government agencies and prove the necessity of reforming
the traditional QC/QA practice. Such data alteration can occur from simple human mistake
or intentional instances. In the age of data science and big data, corruption is considered
encyclopedic and it actively challenges modern society in every aspect. A modern datacentric optimized solution is required for such problems, which encouraged us to take the
machine learning route in my research.
Chapter three of this thesis was focused on quantifying the monetary losses due to
Suspicious Alteration attempts summarized from Chapter 2. In this section, I show that in
almost all of the analyzed projects, altered data resulted in an overpayment.
Major findings from this research include:
i.

There was evidence of data alteration both in the digital format (Excel
sheets) and manual entries (paper-based data reporting).

ii.

A total of 7 Plausible Correction and 4 Suspicions Alteration cases were
identified from the audit datasets.
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iii.

Out of the three payment affecting categories (major/minor/moderate)
defined by the Idaho Transportation Department for Hot Mix Asphalt
(HMA) pavement parameters; major parameters observed most data
alterations, and the number of alterations was significantly higher compared
to the other two categories.

iv.

Supervised machine learning algorithms, like K-nearest neighbor, logistic
regression, support vector machine, and discriminant analysis, exhibited
good performances in categorizing Plausible Correction (P.C.) and
Suspicious Alteration (S.A.) cases. The high accuracy score of these models
supports my logic-based categorization of P.C. and S.A. cases.

v.

HMA testing parameters are run through a series of equations to calculate
lot-wise payment for each project. If the first suspicious alteration was
considered almost half of the lots couldn’t pass the precision check. Further,
only about 1/3 of the lots – with available audit data – would have passed
percent-within-limit thresholds.

vi.

Majority of the projects had a significant amount of overpayment ranging
from $14,000 to more than $360,000. Major unique parameter changes were
also higher on projects where the overpayment was higher.

vii.

On some projects (2 out of 12) there was a minor reduction (-$400 to $2,500) in payment if the first S.A. parameter values were considered.

viii.

Data alterations didn’t always result in a change in monetary value. There
were multiple occasions where data was altered but no monetary change
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was observed, but did result in a change in pass/fail of percent-within-limit
thresholds.
ix.

I considered the same lot formation values available from the reported files.
However, if the first S.A. cases were considered, a lot of tests would fail
which would have required a new lot formation. Since, all these projects
were already completed, and test redone and lot reformation is not possible,
I considered the reported lots. The lot reformation could have resulted in
more overpayment than shown in my results.
Recommendations for Future Research

i.

I considered multiple cases of P.C. and S.A. from the digitized files. However,
paper-based data alteration cases were not considered in my analysis. If there
are enough paper-based data alteration attempts available, such cases should be
included in the algorithm. This would ensure a more robust approach in
detecting data alteration attempts in HMA construction projects.

ii.

Rigorous training of field engineers and technicians (from both contractor and
agency side) involved in HMA production, quality control, and acceptance
testing. Emphasis should be on the importance of test accuracy and
repeatability, and how they affect the end product

iii.

Extensive review of agency-adopted specifications related to HMA mix design
and construction. Special care should be taken to ensure the specifications and
tolerances are developed based on materials commonly used in the region.
Setting “unreasonable” targets for material quality will ultimately lead to
undesirable practices and inferior pavement performance.

111
iv.

I have applied supervised machine learning technique in my analysis. Due to
limited size of the available dataset, I did not try unsupervised machine learning
techniques. If a similar larger dataset is available from ITD or other
transportation/government agencies, unsupervised Machine Learning (ML)
techniques can also be applied.

v.

I couldn’t find a significant relationship between time of data entry and S.A.
cases. A research path can be to implement ML techniques to discover the
relationship between time stamp and probable S.A. attempts.

vi.

The lot reformation was not possible in my analysis. If there is another way of
lot reformation after the project has been completed another approach of
payment calculation can be done.

